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Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fdends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., a plaintiff in an 
action filed in federal court under the citizen suit provision' of the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) may establish standing to sue on the basis of 
recreational or aesthetic injury.2 Laidlaw held that a plaintiff in a CWA 
citizen suit in federal court, seeking an injunction and civil penalties 
against a defendant who is discharging pollutants into a body of water, 
can establish the injury in fact element of federal standing to sue 
requirements by showing that the plaintiff uses an area "affected" by the 
defendant's "challenged activity" and that the defendant's actions have 
"lessened" the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the 
"affected" area.3 However, the Court in Laidlaw did not define 
"affected" area and "challenged activity" for purposes of this principle. 
Courts in future CWA citizen suits against polluters of a water body, 
therefore, will have to determine if the plaintiffs in such suits have 
established recreational or aesthetic injury in fact under Laidlaw in 
varying factual situations. 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D. 1971, Yale Law 
School; B.S. 1968, Cornell University. 
I. 33 u.s.c. § 1365 (2000). 
2. 528 u.s. 167, 183 (2000). 
3. ld 
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In future CWA citizen suits, federal courts also will have to interpret 
an additional holding in Laidlaw, which states that private individuals 
who live "nearby" a polluted river and who seek injunctive relief against 
an alleged polluter of the river establish imminent future recreational and 
aesthetic injury when they allege and establish two things.4 The plaintiffs 
satisfy federal standing to sue requirements, under this additional holding 
in Laidlaw, when they allege and establish (1) that the defendant's 
pollution of the river has caused them to refrain from using the "nearby" 
river for recreational purposes because of their reasonable concerns 
about the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges into the river, and 
(2) that they would use the river for recreation if the defendant was not 
discharging pollutants into ie Because the Laidlaw decision does not 
define "nearby" for purposes of this principle, federal courts in future 
CWA citizen suits against polluters of a water body, that involve facts 
different than those in Laidlaw, face uncertainty as to what types of harm 
to recreational and aesthetic interests will satisfy federal standing to sue 
requirements in such suits. 
Although Laidlaw established federal constitutional standing to sue 
principles for recreational and aesthetic injury in fact that should be 
applicable in actions brought in federal court under the citizen suit 
provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), Laidlaw's standing principles may 
have to be applied differently in cases involving air pollution rather than 
water pollution.6 The distinctions arise because the area "affected" by a 
defendant's emissions of air pollutants may be defined on the basis of 
factors that differ from the factors utilized to define the area "affected" 
by discharges of pollutants into a body of water. 
This Article will analyze the federal standing to sue requirements 
that have to be satisfied by a plaintiff in a CWA or CAA citizen suit 
against a polluter of a water body or outdoor ambient air whose pollutant 
discharges or emissions allegedly cause injury to the plaintiff's 
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of a part of the environment, with 
particular emphasis on the Laidlawdecision.7 
4. Id at 184, 186-87. 
5. Seeidat 181-85. 
6. Seeid 
7. This Article will not analyze standing to sue based upon injury to a person's economic 
and health interests that may be caused by a defendant's discharges of pollutants into a body of 
water or into the outdoor ambient air. 
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I. GENERAL FEDERAL STANDING TO SUE REQUIREMENTS 
Federal standing to sue requirements for a plaintiff in a suit filed in 
a federal court seek to ensure that the plaintiff has "such a 'personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy,' . . . as to ensure that 'the dispute 
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in 
a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution."'8 The 
standing requirement also "tends to assure that the legal questions 
presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a 
debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action."9 
In any suit filed in a federal court, a plaintiff is required to satisfy 
both constitutionally based standing to sue requirements and "prudential" 
standing to sue requirements. 10 A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction 
has the burden of establishing all of these standing requirements as "an 
indispensable part of the plaintiff's case," not as "mere pleading 
requirements;" 11 and a plaintiff in federal court "must demonstrate 
standing separately for each form of relief sought."'2 The federal consti-
tutional standing to sue requirements, which derive from the "case" or 
"controversy" jurisdictional prerequisite of Article III of the United 
States Constitution,'3 are "immutable requirements"'4 that cannot be 
changed by either the federal judiciary or by the United States 
Congress. 15 On the other hand, federal prudential standing to sue 
requirements, which are "'judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction,"''6 can be modified or abrogated by the 
Congress.' 7 
To satisfy the "irreducible constitutional minirnum"'8 federal 
standing to sue requirements, a plaintiff in a suit in a federal court "must, 
generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered 'injury in fact,' that 
8. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (citations omitted). 
9. Valley Forge Christian Coli. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
u.s. 464,472 (1982). 
I 0. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. I 54, 162 (1997). 
II. Lujan v. Defenders ofWiidlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56 I (I992). 
I2. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. I67, I85 
(2000). 
I3. Jd at I80. 
14. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. 
15. Jd 
16. Jd (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (I984)). 
17. ld at I62. 
18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 ( 1992). 
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the injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the 
injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision."'9 
The injury in fact element requires a plaintiff to "have suffered ... 
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized . . . and (b) 'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or 
"hypothetica1.""'20 There is no quantitative standard for the injury in fact 
element: this element can be satisfied by an "identifiable trifle" and a 
plaintiff does not have to be "significantly" affected by the defendant's 
challenged activity in order for this element to be satisfied.2 ' 
Furthermore, the injury in fact suffered by a plaintiff "as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant" can be either actual injury or 
threatened [future] injury.22 "One does not have to await the 
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the 
injury is certainly impending that is enough."23 An injury in fact that has 
occurred in the past may be sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact element 
when a plaintiff is seeking damages for this past injury,24 but when a 
plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish that he or 
she presently is being injured by "continuing, present adverse effects"25 
or will be injured in the imminent future. 26 
The "fairly traceable" element requires a causal connection between 
the injury and the defendant's challenged conduct, such that the injury is 
fairly traceable to the challenged activity of the defendant and not the 
result of an independent action of a third person not before the court.27 
This element only requires a plaintiff to show that there is a "substantial 
likelihood" that the defendant's challenged activity caused the plaintiff's 
injury, 28 and federal courts of appeal have held that the "fairly traceable" 
element does not require that a causal connection be established either to 
a scientific certaintY9 or to a certainty equivalent to that required by tort 
19. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. 
20. Defenders ofWJJdlife, 504 U.S. at 560. 
21. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
689 n.l4 (1973) (citation omitted). 
22. Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99 (1979). 
23. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,593 (1923). 
24. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (presuming that past injury is 
sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact element when the plaintiff is seeking damages). 
25. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,495-96 (1974). 
26. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564-65 n.2 (1992). 
27. Jd at 560. 
28. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978). 
29. Pub. Interest Research Group ofN.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 
64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990), ceJt. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) ; Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 n.7 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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proximate causation standards.30 The redressability element requires that 
the plaintiff show that it is '"likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' 
that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."'31 
Federal "[p ]rudential standing requirements include: 'The general 
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule 
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately 
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a 
plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked."'32 This "zone of interests" requirement mandates that a 
plaintiff "establish that the injury he complains of ... falls within the 
'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision 
whose violation forms the legal basis for the complaint."33 An exception 
to the prudential requirement that a person only has standing to sue based 
upon personal injury to the plaintiff, permits an organization to have 
standing in federal court to assert interests of particular, identified 
members of the organization when these members of the organization 
would have standing to sue in their own right, the interests asserted by 
the organization in the lawsuit are germane to the organization's 
purposes, and neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested in the 
litigation require the personal participation of these members in the 
litigation. 34 
II. PROCEDURAL METHODS TO CHALLENGE A PLAINTIFF'S STANDING 
TO SUE IN A FEDERAL COURT 
A defendant in federal court who seeks to have a case dismissed 
before trial on grounds of the plaintiff's lack of standing should file a 
motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, not a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )( 6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although a plaintiff's allegations in the 
complaint "must be true and capable of proof of trial,"35 if a defendant 
challenges the plaintiff's standing to sue by filing a pre-trial motion to 
30. Powell DuDiyn Terminals, 913 E2d at 72; Watkms, 954 E2d at 980 n.7; Loggerhead 
Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 E3d 1231, 1251 n.23 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1081 (1999) (concluding that "no authority even remotely suggests that 
proximate causation applies to the doctrine of standing"). 
31. Defi:nders of Wild/iii:, 504 U.S. at 561 (citation omitted). 
32. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7 (2002) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751(1984)). 
33. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990). 
34. Hunt v. Wash. StateAppleAdver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,343 (1977). 
35. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
689 (1973). 
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dismiss, a plaintiff's "general factual allegations of injury resulting from 
the defendant's conduct may suffice [to establish the plaintiff's standing 
to sue], for on a motion to dismiss [the Supreme Court] ... 'presume[s] 
that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to 
support the claim."'36 
Consequently, if a defendant in a federal court believes that the 
plaintiff's allegations in his or her complaint in support of standing to sue 
are untrue, the defendant should move for summary judgment under 
Rule 56 on the standing issue and demonstrate to the federal court that 
the plaintiff's allegations with respect to standing "were sham and raised 
no genuine issue of fact."37 "In response to a summary judgment motion, 
... the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,' but must 
'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts,' Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 56( e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be 
taken to be true."38 If the defendant at trial controverts the facts set forth 
by the plaintiff in response to the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, these facts "must be 'supported adequately by the evidence 
adduced at trial."'39 
III. STANDING TO SUE BASED UPON AESTHETIC, RECREATIONAL OR 
CONSERVATIONAL INJURY 
Although the Supreme Court has long recognized that an injury to a 
legally protected economic or property interest is a sufficient basis for 
standing to sue in federal court,40 only in the last thirty or so years has the 
Court recognized that harm to a person's aesthetic, recreational or 
conservational interest can satisfy the "injury in fact" standing 
requirement.41 However, in order for a person to satisfy the injury in fact 
standing requirement on the basis of harm to that person's recreational or 
aesthetic interests, the person must allege and establish that he or she 
physically uses the area affected by the defendant's challenged activity 
36. Defi:nders of Wildlifi:, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Nat'/ Wildlifi: Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 
889). 
3 7. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 689. 
38. Defi:nders of Wildlifi:, 504 U.S. at 561. Under Rule 56( c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file may be 
considered by the court, along with the pleadings and affidavits, in determining whether there is a 
genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to the plaintiff's standing to sue and whether the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Nat'/ Wildlifi: Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 884. 
39. Defi:nders of Wildlifi:, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Viii. of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31 (1979)). 
40. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972). 
41. Id at 733-34; Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 686-
87. 
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and is a "person 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the 
area will be lessened' by the challenged activity.'"'2 By definition, this 
"physical use/presence" requirement for aesthetic or recreational injury is 
not satisfied by a person who derives aesthetic enjoyment only from 
viewing an affected natural area by means of a video, film, still 
photograph, or from reading about the area in a newspaper, book, 
magazine, or other print media. 
The Supreme Court's "use"-of-the-"affected area" test requires both 
( 1) that a person seeking standing to sue on the basis of aesthetic or 
recreational injury must physically use or visit either the exact area where 
the defendant's challenged activity occurs or an area that is "adjacent" to 
("next door'"'3 to) that area, and (2) that the defendant's aesthetic or 
recreational enjoyment of the area is "lessened" by the defendant's 
challenged activity.44 When a plaintiff uses or visits such an "adjacent" or 
"next door" area, a plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational enjoyment from 
physical presence in an area would be "lessened" because of the 
plaintiff's sensory perceptions (usually through sight, sound, or smell) of 
adverse effects on nearby or adjacent land that are caused by the 
defendant's challenged activity.45 However, a plaintiff's mere allegation 
that he or she uses an "area in the vicinity of" the area where the 
defendant's challenged activity occurs is not ·specific enough to satisfy 
this physical use/presence requirement for aesthetic or recreational injury 
in fact.46 Consequently, a plaintiff cannot avoid a court granting a 
defendant's motion for summary judgment under Rule 56( e) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "by averments which state only that 
one of [plaintiff's] ... members uses unspecified portions of an immense 
tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred 
or probably will occur by virtue of the [defendant's challenged] ... 
action.'"'7 
Although adverse effects on outdoor activities such as camping, 
hiking, fishing, swimming, boating, picnicking, bird watching, and 
sightseeing implicitly have been recognized by the Supreme Court as 
42. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 
(2000) (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 735). 
43. DefendersofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (dictum). 
44. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; see Morton, 405 U.S. at 735. 
45. A person engaging in recreational activities near (but not in) a polluted river has been 
held to suffer injury to his aesthetic and recreational interests when he was offended by the color 
and bad odors of the nearby polluted river that he personally perceived through his own senses of 
sight and smell. Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc. 913 
E2d 64,71 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. dem~ 498 U.S 1109 (1991). 
46. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886, 889 ( 1990). 
47. Jd at 889. 
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injuries in fact to aesthetic and recreational interests for purposes of 
satisfying federal standing to sue requirements,48 the Supreme Court has 
never established a general test for determining what types of adverse 
effects to an individual's outdoor activities will be considered to be injury 
in fact to an individual's aesthetic and recreational interests for purposes 
of federal standing to sue requirements. 
In order to qualify as an aesthetic or recreational injury in fact for 
standing to sue purposes, a person's outdoor activity that is adversely 
affected probably would have to be a lawful activity. Adverse effects on 
an individual's outdoor activity should not be considered a recreational or 
aesthetic injury in fact if that activity is illegal under federal, state, or 
local law, because traditionally an injury in fact is recognized only when 
a person's legally protected or legally recognized interests are adversely 
affected.49 Consequently, if a person's fishing or hunting that is adversely 
affected is illegal activity (such as poaching, fishing or hunting out of the 
lawful season, or exceeding legal catch limits), such adverse effects on 
illegal fishing or hunting presumably would not be recognized as 
recreational or aesthetic injury in fact that confers standing to sue. 
Similarly, adverse effects on other illegal outdoor activities, such as 
distilling moonshine whiskey, probably would not be recognized as 
recreational or aesthetic injury in fact for purposes of federal standing to 
sue requirements. 
Although fishing (an activity that may kill or injure certain fish) 
implicitly has been recognized as an outdoor activity that is within an 
individual's aesthetic and recreational interests for standing to sue 
purposes,50 the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the issue of 
whether adverse effects on a person's hunting of wildlife can constitute 
recreational or aesthetic injury. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly addressed the issue of whether adverse effects on a person's 
outdoor activity can be considered to be an injury to that person's 
aesthetic and recreational interests for standing to sue purposes, when 
that outdoor activity causes harm to wildlife, ecosystems or other parts of 
the natural physical environment. A situation raising this issue would be 
presented if a defendant's challenged activity caused adverse effects to a 
plaintiff's recreational use of an off-road vehicle or a snowmobile. 
48. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 
685 (1973); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 
(2000). 
49. Morton, 405 U.S. at 733 (referring to "the various formulations of 'legal interest' and 
'legal wrong' then prevailing as constitutional requirements of standing"). 
50. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 685; Laidlaw, 528 
U.S. at 181-83. 
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Should such adverse effects be considered to be an injury in fact to the 
plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational interests for standing to sue purposes, 
when the plaintiff's adversely-affected outdoor activities cause harm to 
the environment? Even if adverse effects to such environmentally-
harmful outdoor activities are considered recreational or aesthetic injury 
in fact, an individual alleging such injuries, nevertheless, might be denied 
standing to sue in federal court on the ground that such injury is not 
within the zone of interests allegedly protected by a federal 
environmental protection statute. 5 1 
The Supreme Court has identified neither the ways in which a 
person can derive aesthetic enjoyment from an area used or visited by 
that person, nor defined what types of adverse effects upon an individual 
can constitute an injury in fact to that person's aesthetic interests for 
federal standing to sue purposes. The Supreme Court did state in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife that "[ o ]f course, the desire to use or observe an 
animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a 
cognizable interest for purpose of standing."52 Furthermore, the court 
recognized in Laidlaw that adverse effects on an individual's outdoor 
bird-watching activities can constitute aesthetic injury in fact for standing 
to sue purposes.53 Earlier, in Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court 
stated that it did "not question" that "injury in fact" sufficient for 
standing to sue occurs when construction of a road in a national park 
destroys or otherwise adversely affects the scenery, natural and historic 
objects, and wildlife of the park, lessening aesthetic values for users of 
the area.54 
Morton and Laidlaw therefore indicate that aesthetic injury in fact 
may occur when an individual's aesthetic enjoyment of wildlife, an 
ecosystem or a historic structure or object, that results from the person's 
use of her sensory perceptions (including hearing, smell, and touch, as 
well as sight), is adversely affected by a defendant's alteration or 
development of the natural physical environment (or of any historic 
structure or object). The Court, however, also should recognize that a 
person can gain aesthetic enjoyment from knowledge of the 
environmental characteristics of an area used or visited by that person, as 
51. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing the prudential zone of 
interests requirement). 
52. 504 u.s. 555,562-63 (1992). 
53. 528 U.S. at 182-83. 
54. 405 U.S. at 734. 
72 TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17 
well as from the person's sensory perceptions of the area while using or 
being physically present in that area. 55 
The Supreme Court has never required a plaintiff alleging an 
aesthetic injury in fact to establish the truthfulness of the claim by any 
type of objective or quantitative evidence and has given no indication 
whether, or how, a defendant successfully can defend a claim by a 
plaintiff that the defendant's challenged conduct will cause, or has 
caused, adverse effects to the plaintiff's aesthetic enjoyment of the area 
affected by the defendant's conduct. However, the determination of 
whether a plaintiff has suffered an aesthetic injury in fact in most cases 
probably will be based upon the plaintiff's subjective allegations and 
statements, because "aesthetic perceptions are necessarily personal and 
subjective"-unless a plaintiff's claim that the defendant's challenged 
activity lessens the plaintiff's aesthetic enjoyment of a particular 
"affected area" is found to be too preposterous to be believed to be true. 56 
Although the Supreme Court in Morton stated in dictum that the 
injury in fact element of federal standing to sue requirements can be 
satisfied when there is an injury to a conservational value or interest of 
the plaintiff/7 the Supreme Court has never defined the term 
"conservational value," and has never stated whether a person alleging a 
conservational injury in fact must satisfy the physical user test that is 
required for a recreational or aesthetic injury in faces 
IV STANDING TO SUE IN POLLUTION CASES UNDER FRIENDS OF THE 
EARTH, INC. V. LAIDLAW ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES {TOC), INC. 
The Supreme Court in Laidlaw addressed in depth for the first time 
the issue of the requirements that an individual alleging aesthetic and 
recreational injury in fact must satisfy in order to meet federal standing 
to sue requirements in a suit seeking injunctive relief and assessment of 
55. See Vt. Pub. Interest Research Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 247 E Supp. 2d 
495, 510-11 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff, who visited a particular affected area where he 
studied and engaged in recreational activities, had standing to sue in a suit seeking to protect a 
rare species that inhabited streams in the affected area, even if the plaintiff had not personally 
observed any members of these rare species, because of the value the plaintiff placed on knowing 
that these species existed in these streams). The court seemed to consider this value, that the 
plaintiff derived from knowing these species existed in the affected area used by the plaintiff for 
recreational activities, to be part of the plaintiff's aesthetic enjoyment of the affected area, by 
stating "There can be no doubt that such concrete interests include the kind of aesthetic and 
recreational uses ... that the affiants claim to enjoy." Id at 509. 
56. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 E3d 1141, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 
57. Morton, 405 U.S. at 738. 
58. This Article therefore will not analyze "conservational" injury in fact as a basis for 
satisfYing federal standing to sue requirements. 
2003] STANDING TO SUE IN CITIZEN SUITS 73 
civil penalties against a facility discharging pollutants into a river or other 
surface body of water.59 In Laidlaw, the Supreme Court held that 
residents who lived near the river and the defendant's facility had 
standing to sue the owner of the facility for civil penalties and injunctive 
relief because they alleged both (1) that they were refraining from using 
either the river or areas bordering the river because of the defendant's 
"continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into [the 
river]" (due to their reasonable fears of defendant's discharges of 
pollutants) and (2) "that they would use the nearby ... [r]iver for 
recreation if [the defendant] ... were not discharging pollutants into it."60 
The Laidlaw case involved a waste water treatment plant in 
Roebuck, South Carolina (that was part of a hazardous waste incinerator 
facility) that was owned by Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 
(Laidlaw) and discharges from that facility of pollutants, particularly the 
"extremely toxic pollutant" mercury, into the North Tyger River in South 
Carolina.61 The Laidlaw plant received an NPDES permit from the South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) that 
placed limits on Laidlaw's discharges of several pollutants (including 
mercury) into the North Tyger River.62 The plant "repeatedly" discharged 
pollutants into the river that exceeded the limits set by Laidlaw's NPDES 
permit, with Laidlaw "consistently fail[ing] to meet the permit's stringent 
... daily average limit on mercury discharges."63 
After Friends of the Earth, Inc. and a local environmental 
organization notified Laidlaw that they would file a citizen suit against 
Laidlaw under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act after expiration of 
59. 528 U.S. 167, 181-88 (2000). In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978), an earlier decision involving air and water pollution, the 
Supreme Court held that individuals seeking to halt the construction of two new nuclear power 
plants that were being built near their homes established satisfactory environmental, aesthetic, 
and health injury in fact for purposes of federal standing to sue requirements, but did so in 
cursory fashion without identifying and applying the relevant legal principles, as the Court did in 
Laidlaw. In Duke Power Co., the Court Erst held that satisfactory injury in fact was established 
on the basis of the environmental and aesthetic consequences of thermal pollution that the power 
plants would discharge into lakes used by the plaintiffs for recreational purposes, with the Court 
merely citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 
669, 689 (1973), and Morton, 405 U.S. at 734, in support of this holding. Duke Power Co., 438 
U.S. at 73-74. Duke Power Co. also held that "the emission of non-natural radiation into the 
[plaintiffs'] ... environment would also seem a direct and present injury, given our generalized 
concern about exposure to radiation and the apprehension flowing from the uncertainty about the 
health and genetic consequences of even small emissions like those concededly emitted by 
nuclear power plants." /d at 74. 
60. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
61. /d at 176. 
62. /d 
63. /d 
74 TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17 
the CWA's requisite sixty-day notice period,64 Laidlaw arranged to have 
the DHEC file an enforcement suit against Laidlaw (using a complaint 
drafted and filed by Laidlaw, with Laidlaw also paying the filing fee6), in 
an attempt to have the proposed CWA citizen suit barred through the 
provisions of section 505(b)(1)(B) ofthe CWA.66 On the last day before 
the sixty-day notice period expired, the DHEC and Laidlaw agreed to a 
settlement of the DHEC's enforcement suit, whereby Laidlaw agreed to 
pay $100,000 in civil penalties and "to make 'every effort' to comply 
with its permit obligations."67 
Despite this settlement agreement, Friends of the Earth, Sierra 
Club, and a local environmental organization (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as FOE) filed a CWA citizen suit against Laidlaw on June 
12, 1992, three days after the settlement agreement was reached.68 FOE, 
in its complaint, alleged that Laidlaw was not in compliance with its 
CWA NPDES permit and requested declaratory and injunctive relief and 
assessment of civil penalties against Laidlaw.69 
After Laidlaw filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that FOE lacked standing to sue, FOE submitted to the district court 
affidavits and deposition testimony of members of the plaintiff 
organizations. 70 These members, who gave sworn statements, asserted 
that their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests were adversely 
affected by Laidlaw's discharges of pollutants into the North Tyger 
River. 7' The district court denied Laidlaw's motion for summary 
judgment after examining FOE's submissions and other affidavits of 
members of the plaintiff organizations that were previously submitted by 
the plaintiffs in support of an earlier motion for preliminary injunctive 
relief. 72 The district court also denied Laidlaw's motion to dismiss the 
citizen suit under section 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA, because the district 
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (2000) (stating that section 505(b)(l)(A) of the CWA 
requires that prior notice of the proposed filing of a CWA citizen suit be given by the prospective 
plaintiff to the alleged violator of the CWA (who is the prospective defendant in the suit), the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] and the state water pollution 
control agency of the state where the defendant's alleged violations are occurring). 
65. LaJdlaw, 528 U.S. at 176-77, 178n.l. 
66. /datl76-77. 
67. Id at 177 (citation omitted). 
68. Id 
69. /d 
70. /d 
71. /d at 181-84. 
72. Id at 177; see infia notes 88-95 and accompanying text (describing the sworn 
statements of six of these members upon which Justice Ginsburg subsequently relied to hold that 
the plaintiff organizations had standing, on behalf of these members, to sue for injunctive relief 
and civil penalties). 
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court held that the DHEC's enforcement action against Laidlaw had not 
been "diligently prosecuted."73 
In January 1997, more than four years after FOE filed its citizen 
suit against Laidlaw, the district court issued its final judgment in the 
case, in which it assessed Laidlaw $405,800 in civil penalties (to be paid 
to the United States Treasury).74 However, the district court declined to 
issue the injunctive relief requested by FOE, on the ground "that an 
injunction was inappropriate because 'Laidlaw has been in substantial 
compliance with all parameters in its NPDES permit since at least 
August 1992,"' with the last recorded discharge of mercury in violation 
of Laidlaw's NPDES permit having occurred in January 1995.75 
FOE appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit on the ground that the amount of civil penalties assessed by the 
district court was inadequate, but did not appeal the district court's denial 
of the requested declaratory and injunctive relief. 76 Laidlaw cross-
appealed, on grounds that included FOE's lack of standing to sue and that 
the citizen suit was barred because the DHEC's enforcement actions and 
settlement agreement with Laidlaw were "diligent prosecution" within 
the meaning of section 505(b )( 1 )(B) of the CWA. 77 
The Court of Appeals issued a judgment vacating the district court's 
order and remanding with instructions to dismiss the action on the 
ground that the case was moot. 78 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the 
case was moot since "the only remedy currently available ... --civil 
penalties payable to the government-would not redress any injury 
[suffered by FOE]."79 The Court of Appeals assumed that FOE had 
standing to sue to bring the citizen suit, without deciding that issue.80 
After this decision by the Court of Appeals, Laidlaw closed its entire 
incinerator facility in Roebuck, South Carolina, and all discharges from 
the facility into the North Tyger River "permanently ceased."81 
The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari in the case, "to 
resolve the inconsistency between the Fourth Circuit's decision in this 
case and the decisions of several other Courts of Appeals, which have 
73. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 177. 
74. Id at 178. 
75. Id (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. 
Supp. 588,611 (D.S.C. 1997)). 
76. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 179. 
77. Id 
78. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
79. Id 
80. See id at 306 n.3. 
81. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 179. 
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held that a defendant's compliance with its permit after the 
commencement of litigation does not moot claims for civil penalties 
under the Act."82 
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding 
that the case was moot,83 but on its own initiative also addressed the issue 
of whether FOE met federal standing to sue requirements in the case.84 
Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion for the Court, held "that FOE had 
standing under Article III to bring this action."85 
Justice Ginsburg held that the sworn affidavits and depositions of 
six members of the plaintiff organizations (Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela 
Patterson, Judy Pruitt, Linda Moore, Gail Lee, and Norman Sharp) 
"adequately documented injury in fact" to "those affiants' recreational, 
aesthetic and economic interests."86 Stating that "[t]he relevant showing 
for purposes of Article III standing ... is not injury to the environment 
but injury to the plaintiff," Justice Ginsburg rejected Laidlaw's argument 
that these members did not show that they "had sustained or faced the 
threat of any 'injury in fact' from Laidlaw's activities" because they 
failed to prove that Laidlaw's discharges of mercury, in violation of 
discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, resulted in any harm to the 
environment or any health risk. 87 
According to Justice Ginsburg, Curtis stated in his affidavits and 
depositions that he lived a half-mile from Laidlaw's facility, and that as a 
teenager he had fished, camped, swam, and picnicked in and near the 
river between three and fifteen miles downstream from the Laidlaw 
facility and would like to do so again.88 Curtis, however, stated that he 
did not do so now because of his concern that the river's water (which he 
said looked and smelled polluted) was polluted by Laidlaw's discharges. 89 
Patterson stated that she lived two miles from the Laidlaw facility, and 
that before Laidlaw operated the facility, she had picnicked, walked, bird-
watched, and waded in and along the river because of its natural beauty. 90 
Patterson stated, however, "that she no longer engaged in these activities 
in or near the river because she was concerned about harmful effects 
82. Id at 179-80. 
83. Id at 180. 
84. Id The Court raised the standing to sue issue on its own initiative because lack of 
standing to sue would deprive the Court of Article III jurisdiction. Id 
85. Id at 189. 
86. Id at 183-84. 
87. Id at 181; see in!Ta 146-148 and accompanying text. 
88. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-82. 
89. Id 
90. Id at 182. 
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from discharged pollutants," and that she and her husband, despite a 
desire to do so, did not intend to purchase a home near the river, "in part 
because of Laidlaw's discharges."91 Pruitt, who lived one-quarter mile 
from the Laidlaw facility, was described as desiring to fish, hike, and 
picnic along the river but as not doing so because of Laidlaw's 
discharges.92 Moore, who lived twenty miles from Roebuck (where 
Laidlaw's facility was located), attested that she would use the river south 
of Roebuck, and lands bordering it, for hiking, picnicking, camping, 
swimming, boating, and diving were she not concerned about Laidlaw's 
illegal discharges and pollutants in the water.93 Lee attested that her 
home, located "near" the Laidlaw facility (with the exact distance not 
specified by Justice Ginsburg), had a lower value than similar homes 
located farther away from the facility and that she believed that some of 
this lower value was due to Laidlaw's pollutant discharges.94 Sharp stated 
that he canoed on the river about forty miles downstream from the 
Laidlaw facility and would like to canoe in the river closer to the Laidlaw 
facility, but did not do so because of his concern "that the water 
contained harmful pollutants."95 
As described by Justice Ginsburg, these affiants did not assert that 
they suffered a past injury in fact resulting from the defendant's alleged 
unlawful pollutant discharges into the river that lessened their 
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment during their past use of the river and 
surrounding areas.96 Nor did the affiants appear to assert that they would 
in the future suffer imminent injury in fact as a result of the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful pollutant discharges into the river lessening their 
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment during their future use of the river 
and surrounding areas.97 
Instead, these affiants' sworn statements asserted that the affiants 
suffered or would suffer injury in fact both (1) because they refrained 
from recreational use of the river and surrounding areas because of fears 
and concerns about the effects of the defendant's discharges of pollutants 
into the river and (2) because they would use the river and surrounding 
areas for recreational activities if the defendant's discharges of pollutants 
into the river ceased.98 This first asserted injury in fact (from the affiants' 
91. Id 
92. Jd 
93. /d 
94. /d at 182-83. 
95. /d at 183. 
96. Seeidat181-83. 
97. Seeid 
98. Seeid 
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refraining from recreational use of the river and surrounding areas) might 
be interpreted as not only asserting an injury that occurred in the past 
(prior to the filing of the lawsuit), but as also asserting both (1) a present 
injury in fact that was continuing at the present time (after the lawsuit 
was filed through the Supreme Court's issuance of its judgment in the 
case) and (2) an imminent future injury that would continue into the 
immediate future (after the Supreme Court's judgment was issued) until 
the defendant's pollutant discharges (or allegedly unlawful pollutant 
discharges) ceased. The affiants' second asserted injury (future use of 
the river that is conditioned upon the defendant's pollutant discharges 
ending) might be interpreted as complementing the affiants' first asserted 
injury in fact, together asserting that in the imminent near future the 
affiants would refrain from recreational use of the river and surrounding 
areas because of fears and concerns about the effects of the defendant's 
pollutant discharges into the river, but that the affiants would begin 
recreational uses of the river and surrounding areas if the defendant's 
pollutant discharges (or allegedly unlawful pollutant discharges) ceased.99 
Justice Ginsburg held that these members' "sworn statements ... 
adequately documented injury in. fact," 100 on the basis of the principle 
"that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they 
aver that they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the 
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the 
challenged activity."101 
Justice Ginsburg based this principle upon the Supreme Court's 
1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, which she quoted in her 
statement of the principle. 102 In Morton, which established the "physical 
user" test for aesthetic and recreational injury in fact for standing to sue 
purposes, 103 the Supreme Court did not "question" that the type of harm 
that would result from proposed changes to Mineral King Valley as a 
result of construction of a huge resort complex "may amount to an 
'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the 
APA."104 After noting that the resort complex would result in "change in 
99. This latter conditional assertion of future use of the river appears to be conditioned 
upon the defendant ending all of its discharges of pollutants into the river, not just ending the 
allegedly unlawful discharges that were in violation of the discharge limitations in the defendant's 
CWA NPDES permit. See id at 184 (noting "affiants' conditional statements that they would use 
the nearby North Tyger River for recreation ifLaid1aw were not discharging pollutants into it"). 
100. Jd at 183. 
101. Jd (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). 
102. Jd 
103. See supra notes 42-4 7 and accompanying text (discussing the physical user test). 
104. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. 
2003] STANDING TO SUE IN CITIZEN SUITS 79 
the uses, to which Mineral King will be put, and the attendant change in 
the aesthetics and ecology of the area,"105 the Court in Morton then noted 
that the plaintiff's complaint alleged that a road that would be 
constructed through Sequoia National Park for the resort complex 
'"would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and 
historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment 
of the park for future generations."'106 The Court in Morton also stated 
that "the alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use 
Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and 
recreational values of the area will be lessened by the highway and ski 
resort."107 
Morton probably used "adversely affected" area terminology 
because the plaintiff in that action brought suit under section 1 0 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which provides that "[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof."108 Although the APA only governs 
suits in federal courts against federal administrative agencies that are 
subject to the requirements of the APA, the CWA's citizen suit provision, 
which was the basis for the plaintiffs' suit in Laidlaw, authorizes certain 
suits to be brought under its provisions against a private business 
corporation or individual by "a person or persons having an interest 
which is or may be adversely affected."109 This language in the CWA 
citizen suit provision was previously interpreted by the Supreme Court as 
conferring standing to sue on a "broad category of potential plaintiffs" 
who "can claim some sort of injury," whether economic or noneco-
nomic!10 Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw, therefore, needed no explicit 
justification for extending Morton's "adversely affected area" test, for 
determining aesthetic and recreational injury in fact, to a suit against a 
privately owned facility in a citizen suit under the CWA. 
The Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, however, authorizes 
certain citizen suits by "any person," without any requirement that a 
105. Id 
106. Id 
107. /dat735. 
I 08. 5 U.S. C. § 702 (2000). 
109. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g) (2000). The CWA defmes "person" to mean "an individual, 
corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or other political 
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id § 1362(5). 
110. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'! Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 16-17 
(1981). 
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"person" have an interest that is or may be "adversely affected."111 The 
CAA citizen suit provision thus appears to permit a suit under its 
provisions by any person who meets federal constitutional standing to 
sue requirements. Justice Ginsburg's stated principle in Laidlaw for 
recreational or aesthetic injury in fact refers to "environmental 
plaintiffs"112 generally, not just to plaintiffs in CWA citizen suits, and is 
stated as a principle governing the injury in fact element of federal 
constitutional standing requirements (not standing requirements only for 
Clean Water Act citizen suits). A plaintiff in a CAA citizen suit, 
therefore, should be able to establish recreational and aesthetic injury in 
fact under Laidlaw's principles. 
Consequently, Laidlaw's test for recreational and aesthetic injury in 
fact also should apply to citizen suits brought under the Clean Air Ad 13 
and other federal statutes that authorize certain suits either by an 
"adversely affected person" or by any "person."114 
Justice Ginsburg's test in Laidlaw for recreational and aesthetic 
injury in fact only requires a plaintiff to allege and establish that the 
defendant's challenged activity "lessens" or will "lessen" the plaintiff's 
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected area." 
Under Laidlaw, then, an individual can establish "injury in fact" by 
showing a connection to the area of concern sufficient to make credible the 
contention that the person's future life will be less enjoyable--that he or 
she really has [suffered] or will suffer in his or her degree of aesthetic or 
recreational satisfaction--if the area in question remains or becomes 
environmentally degraded. Factors of residential contiguity [to the 
affected area] and frequency of use [of the affected area] may certainly be 
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000). The Clean Air Act defmes "person" to include "an 
individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, political subdivision of a 
State, and any agency, department, or instrumentality of the United States and any officer, agent, 
or employee thereof" Id § 7602( e). 
112. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 
(2000). 
113. Several federal district courts have applied Laidlaw in CAA citizen suits in 
determining the injury-in-fact element of federal standing to sue requirements. Bayview Hunters 
Point Cmty. Advocates v. Metro. Transp. Comm'n, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2001); 
Cmtys. for Better Env't v. Cenco Ref, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
114. Laidlaw's test for recreational and aesthetic injury has been applied in a suit brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (the Clean Air Act's general judicial review provision), New lV!K 
Public Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 2003); and in a suit brought 
under 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(l) (2000) (the general judicial review provision of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act), Central & South l*st Services, Inc. v. United States EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 
700-01 (5th Cir. 2000), reh 'g denied, 237 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.), cei1. denied, Utility Solid Waste 
Activities Group v. EPA, 532 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
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relevant to that determination, but are not to be evaluated in a one-size-fits-
all, mechanistic manner.115 
81 
Although Justice Ginsburg's decision in Laidlaw holds that the 
injury in fact element can be satisfied by a plaintiff using an area 
"affected" by the defendant's challenged activity and whose recreational 
or aesthetic enjoyment of the area is "lessened" by the defendant's 
"challenged activity," her opinion neither defines "affected area" and 
defendant's "challenged activity" for purposes of federal standing to sue 
requirements, nor specifies factors that are relevant to determining 
whether a specific geographical area is part of an area "affected" by the 
defendant's challenged activity. 1 16 
Although Justice Ginsburg neither defined the term "challenged 
activity" nor identified the actions of defendant Laidlaw that she 
considered to be the defendant's "challenged activity," she appears to 
consider defendant Laidlaw's "challenged activity" to be only the portion 
of Laidlaw's pollutant discharges into the North Tyger River allegedly 
violating Laidlaw's CWA NPDES permit-not the entire amount of 
Laidlaw's pollutant discharges into the river. This conclusion is based 
upon the references, in the injury-in-fact portion of Justice Ginsburg's 
opinion, to "Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-discharging pollutants in 
excess of permit limits" and Laidlaw's "illegal discharges," as well as the 
fact that the amounts of pollutants discharged by Laidlaw into the river 
that did not exceed the effiuent limitations in its CWA NPDES permit 
would not be illegal discharges that could be enjoined in a CWA citizen 
suit. 117 
Consequently, "challenged activity" for purposes of La1dlaws 
injury-in-fact test should be defined as only the parts of a defendant's 
activities that allegedly violate the United States Constitution or a federal 
statute or regulation, and should not include parts of the defendant's 
activities that are not alleged to be illegal or unlawful. Under this 
approach, in a CWA or CAA citizen suit alleging that a defendant has 
violated monitoring, reporting, or record-keeping requirements, the 
defendant's "challenged activity" probably should be found to be the 
defendant's failure to do the required monitoring of pollutants, reporting 
or record-keeping. 
In determining whether the amount of pollutants discharged by a 
polluter into a river in violation of discharge limitations in its NPDES 
115. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141,1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 
116. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183. 
117. /d at 184. 
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permit "affected" areas used by the plaintiffs' members and lessened 
their recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the affected areas they used, 
a court should consider the cumulative impacts of both the defendant's 
illegal discharges and legal discharges and the discharges of the same 
types of pollutants into the river by other persons, because "even a slight 
increase in adverse conditions that form an existing environmental milieu 
may sometimes threaten harm that is significant. One more factory 
polluting air and water in an area zoned for industrial use may represent 
the straw that breaks the back of the environmental camel." 118 
Consequently, a court, in determining · whether allegedly unlawful 
discharges of pollutants by a defendant "affect" a particular area and 
"lessen" the plaintiff's recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of that area, 
should determine the extent of the impacts of those allegedly unlawful 
discharges when added to the adverse effects caused by both the lawful 
portions of the defendant's pollutant discharges and the pollutant 
discharges by other persons. A court, when applying La1dlaws injury in 
fact test, should not seek to determine, hypothetically, what adverse 
impacts the unlawful portion of a defendant's pollutant discharges would 
cause to the area in question, and to the plaintiff's recreational and 
aesthetic enjoyment of that area, in a hypothetical situation where the 
defendant's unlawful discharges were the only pollutant discharges 
affecting the area in question. 
Although Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw does not define 
"affected area" for purposes of"injury in fact," her opinion should not be 
interpreted as establishing a per se standard defining "affected area" 
exactly the same way in all CWA citizen suits, requiring in every CWA 
citizen suit that the specific place used by the plaintiff be within a 
specified distance to the place where the defendant discharged pollutants. 
In Laidlaw, member Norman Sharp's recreational use of the river for 
canoeing forty miles downstream from the Laidlaw facility was the 
activity farthest away from the Laidlaw facility among the six members 
whose affected interests were described by Justice Ginsburg.119 However, 
Justice Ginsburg made no statements indicating that another member's 
recreational use of a river more than forty miles downstream from the 
defendant's facility could not have been considered to be a use of the 
"affected area." Justice Ginsburg made no statements indicating that in 
other CWA citizen suits, involving different facts, the "affected area" 
118. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 
(1973) (involving the National Environmental Policy Act§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). 
119. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183. 
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would always extend forty miles downstream from the defendant's 
facility that discharges pollutants into a river or stream. 
From a scientific standpoint, a per se "mileage" test should not be 
adopted for the interpretation of "affected area," because in most 
situations the determination of whether a specific place is an area 
"affected" by a defendant's discharges or emissions of a particular type of 
pollutant into a body of water or outdoor ambient air (and an area where 
the plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational enjoyment of the area is lessened 
by the defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions) will depend upon 
the concentration of the type of pollutant (expressed in terms of the 
weight of that pollutant in a particular volume of water or air) that is 
measured at the specific place, and the harm or threatened harm resulting 
from that concentration of pollutants in that specific place. 
However, federal courts should not adopt a test for recreational and 
aesthetic injury in fact that requires a citizen plaintiff in a CWA or CAA 
citizen suit to measure scientifically the concentration of pollutants in a 
specific place in a body of water or outdoor ambient air used by the 
plaintiff and to have that scientific data assessed by an expert scientist to 
determine whether the measured pollutant concentration harms or 
threatens harm to the environment or public health. 120 Such a test 
would further thwart congressional intent by recreating the old system of 
water quality standards whose failure led to the enactment of the Clean 
Water Act in the first place .... An important reason for Congress' shift to 
end-of-pipe standards was to eliminate the need to address complex 
questions of environmental abasement and scientific traceability in 
enforcement proceedings. To have standing now turn on direct evidence of 
such things as the chemical composition and salinity of receiving waters 
would throw federal legislative efforts to control water pollution into a time 
warp by judicially reinstating the previous statutory regime in the form of 
escalated standing requirements. Courts would become enmeshed in 
abstruse scientific discussions as standing questions assumed a 
complicated life of their own. 121 
A requirement that the "affected area" be established by scientific 
measurements in most cases also would be such an expensive and 
120. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 162 
(4th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (holding that Article III of the United States Constitution does not 
require "laboratory analysis of the chemical content, salinity or ecosystem" of the area used by 
the plaintiff for recreational activities in order to satisfy federal standing to sue requirements, and 
that Congress does not require such scientific evidence in order for a plaintiff to achieve standing 
to sue in a CWA citizen suit). 
121. Id at 163. 
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burdensome requirement that many meritorious citizen suits would be 
deterred from being brought under the CWA and CAA. 
Of course, a plaintiff in a CWA or CAA citizen suit should be 
permitted to introduce scientific measurements of the concentrations of 
pollutants in the outdoor ambient air or a body of water at a specific 
location, and expert scientific witnesses testifying as to the likely source 
of those pollutants and the harm or effects to the environment caused by 
such pollutant concentrations, to establish that a specific area, used by 
the plaintiff for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment, is "affected" by the 
pollutants discharged or emitted by a particular defendant. But a plaintiff 
in a CWA or CAA citizen suit should not be required to introduce such 
scientific evidence in order to establish recreational or aesthetic injury in 
fact under Laidlaw. 
To avoid unnecessarily placing expensive scientific monitoring 
requirements upon plaintiffs in CWA and CAA citizen suits, the 
determination of whether a specific place is an area "affected" by the 
defendant's discharges or emissions of pollutants should be permitted to 
be based upon two factors: (1) the distance between the specific place 
used by the plaintiff and the place where the defendant discharged or 
emitted pollutants (with this distance of separation being used as an 
approximate measure of the concentration of the discharged or emitted 
pollutants at the place used by the plaintiff) and (2) the type of statutory 
or regulatory violation allegedly committed by the defendant whose 
pollutant discharges or emissions are being challenged (with the type of 
violation being used as an approximate measure of the adverse effects 
that a defendant's discharge may have upon "nearby" areas). 122 
Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the injury in fact element in her 
majority opinion in Laidlawmay be interpreted as implicitly permitting 
this approach. Her opinion refers not only to the defendant's "illegal 
discharges"123 allegedly not in compliance with effluent limitations in the 
defendant's NPDES permit/24 but also refers to the affiant members who 
established injury in fact as residing "nearby" the North Tyger River. 125 
The opinion explicitly identifies for each of these affiant members 
(except for member Gail Lee) either the distance between a member's 
residence and Laidlaw's facility, or the distance between the place used 
122. See infi"anotes 145-161 and accompanying text (discussing latter factor). 
123. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
124. Id at 181. 
125. Id at 184. 
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(or desired to be used) by a member for recreational activity and 
Laidlaw's facility (or both). 126 
Although Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlawdoes not explicitly 
explain why the type of alleged violation of the CWA or CAA should be 
a relevant factor in determining whether a specific place is part of the 
area "affected" by the defendant's challenged activity, the injury in fact 
part of her opinion may be interpreted as implicitly holding that, as a 
matter of law, injury in fact should be found to occur to recreational users 
of areas "nearby" a facility allegedly discharging pollutants in violation 
of discharge limitations in an NPDES permit. This interpretation rests on 
the grounds that as a matter oflaw the defendant's unlawful discharges in 
excess of its permit's effluent limitations "affect" nearby areas by 
lessening the recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of users of that 
affected area. Furthermore, this interpretation is based upon Justice 
Ginsburg's statement that the "standing hurdle" should not be raised 
"higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an action 
alleging noncompliance with [effluent limitations of] an NPDES 
permit."127 This statement should be interpreted as indicating that Justice 
Ginsburg's Laidlaw decision seeks to simplify the burden of proof that a 
plaintiff must meet in a CWA citizen suit in order to establish standing to 
sue. The statement supports a rule providing that a defendant's unlawful 
excess discharges of pollutants, allegedly in violation of discharge 
limitations in a CWA NPDES permit, will be considered, as a matter of 
law, both to "affect" areas in the river and on the shores of the river that 
are "nearby" the defendant's facility and also to lessen the recreational 
and aesthetic enjoyment of the river and its shore by users of those 
nearby areas. 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion, however, does not provide any 
indication of whether violations of the CWA or CAA, other than 
violations of discharge or emission limitations in a CWA or CAA permit, 
can be the basis for a holding that another type of violation (such as 
violation of a water quality standard that is caused by a defendant's 
126. Member Curtis stated both the distance between his residence and Laidlaw's facility 
and the distance between Laidlaw's facility and the places he desired to use for recreational 
purposes. ld at 181-82. Member Patterson referred to the distance between her home and 
Laidlaw's facility and also stated that she would like to purchase a home "near" the river but 
would not in part because of Laidlaw's discharges. Jd at 182. Members Pruitt and Moore 
attested to the distance between their homes and Laidlaw's facility. Jd Member Lee stated that 
her home is "near" Laidlaw's facility, while member Sharp identified the distance between 
Laidlaw's facility and places on the river he used or desired to use for recreational canoeing. Jd 
at 182-83; see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (describing these members' specific 
allegations). 
127. LaJdlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. 
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pollutant discharges, or a violation of a monitoring, reporting, or record-
keeping requirement in an NPDES permit) can be considered to "affect" 
areas "near" where a defendant otherwise lawfully discharges 
pollutants. 128 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw does not explicitly state that 
the determination of whether a specific location is part of the area 
"affected" by the defendant's challenged discharge of pollutants should 
be based, at least in part, on how close that area is to the place where the 
defendant is discharging pollutants into a river. The opinion also makes 
no references to the concentration of mercury (or other pollutants 
discharged by Laidlaw) in any part of the river at or near places used by 
the affiant members for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment. 
However, if the determination of whether a specific place that is 
used by a plaintiff for recreational or aesthetic purposes, is part of an 
"affected area," is not required to be established by scientific 
measurements of pollutant concentrations in that specific place, the 
determination of whether that place is "affected" by a defendant's 
discharges or emissions of pollutants into a body of water or outdoor 
ambient air should be based, in part, upon a determination by the court of 
whether that specific place is sufficiently close to the place where the 
pollutants were discharged or emitted. In order to hold that a place is an 
affected area, a court should find that the concentration of the pollutants 
discharged or emitted by the defendant probably is high enough in or 
near that place to cause the plaintiff to have a reasonable concern or fear 
that the defendant's pollutant discharges present a risk to human health or 
to the environment, and consequently lessen the plaintiff's recreational 
use or aesthetic enjoyment of that area. 129 This "reasonable concern" test 
128. Seediscussion infianotes 156-161 and accompanying text. 
129. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (en bane). The court essentially followed this recommended approach to hold that a 
plaintiff, who resided and engaged in recreational activities four miles downstream from the 
location where the defendant discharged pollutants into a waterway in violation of discharge 
limitations in its NPDES permit, established standing to sue under Laidlaw, despite not having 
introduced scientific measurements of the concentrations of the pollutants in downstream waters 
used by the plaintiff for recreational activities. Id at 163. The court held that the plaintiff 
established recreational injury (from decreased recreational activities in nearby downstream 
waters because of reasonable fear of the effects of the defendant's illegal pollutant discharges) and 
economic injury that were fairly traceable to the defendant's illegal pollutant discharges, on the 
basis of evidence that the same types of pollutants discharged upstream by the defendant had 
been found in the downstream waterway used by the plaintiff, evidence that pollutants discharged 
by the defendant could flow at least 16.5 miles downstream from the place of discharge (12.5 
miles beyond the place used by the plaintiff for recreational activities), evidence that the types of 
pollutants discharged by the defendant can cause adverse health and environmental effects, and 
evidence that many of the discharge limitations in the defendant's NPDES permit were imposed 
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is based upon Justice Ginsburg's holding in Laidlaw that the affiant 
members established injury in fact by establishing that their reasonable 
concern and fear about the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges 
caused them to refrain from recreational use ofthe North Tyger River and 
to suffer "other economic and aesthetic harms."'30 
In some cases, a specific place used by a plaintiff for recreational or 
aesthetic enjoyment may be so close to the place where the defendant 
discharges or emits pollutants that the presence and effects of those 
pollutants in a body of water or outdoor ambient air can be detected by 
the plaintiff's sense of sight or smell.' 3 ' In such a case, a court can rely 
upon the personal observations of the plaintiff to hold that the area 
"affected" by the defendant's discharges of pollutants includes the place 
where the plaintiff made these personal observations. 132 
Usually, however, a number of factors should be considered by a 
court to determine if a specific place used by a plaintiff for recreational 
or aesthetic enjoyment is sufficiently close enough to the place where the 
defendant discharges pollutants into a body of water or emits pollutants 
into outdoor ambient air. The factors allow the court to conclude 
reasonably that pollutant concentrations probably are high enough at or 
near that place to cause the plaintiff to have a reasonable concern about 
the health or environmental risks of these pollutants. 
In the case of pollutants discharged into a river or stream from a 
facility located on the banks, the concentration of the discharged 
pollutants in any particular part of the river or stream downstream from 
the place of discharge will depend, in part, upon the volume and 
concentration of the pollutants in the discharges from the defendant's 
facility, the flow rate of the river or stream at the place where pollutants 
are discharged, and the amounts and types of pollutants that are 
discharged into the river or stream by other persons from other facilities. 
In addition, when pollutants are discharged into a river or stream, even on 
a continuous basis, the concentration of those pollutants will decrease the 
farther downstream the discharged pollutants travel as additional 
amounts of water from runoff and tributaries flow into the river or 
stream. Pollution concentrations may also decrease continuously the 
in order to achieve a particular water quality. ld at 157-59. The court concluded that "[c]itizens 
may thus rely on circumstantial evidence such as proximity to polluting sources, predictions of 
discharge influence, and past pollution to prove both injury in fact and traceability." Jd at 163. 
130. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183-84; see discussion infTa notes 165-167, 187-218 and 
accompanying text. 
131. In Laidlaw, Justice Ginsburg noted that affiant member Kenneth Lee Curtis had 
attested in affidavits that the North Tyger River "looked and smelled polluted." 528 U.S. at 181. 
132. Seeid 
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farther downstream the discharged pollutants are carried by the river or 
stream as some of the discharged pollutants evaporate, settle to the 
bottom or are removed from the water by fish, wildlife, or plants 
ingesting water. The addition of more water to a river or stream dilutes 
the concentration of pollutants previously discharged and the removal of 
some of the discharged pollutants further dilutes the concentration of the 
discharged pollutants. 
Of course, no significant amounts of pollutants discharged into a 
river or stream should be found in waters that are upstream from the 
place where the pollutants were discharged. The upstream areas in or 
near the river or stream usually will not be an area "affected" by a 
downstream discharge of pollutants, unless the upstream area is adjacent 
to or near the place of discharge (so that persons using these upstream 
areas have lessened aesthetic or recreational enjoyment of these upstream 
areas as a result of their viewing or smelling the defendant's pollutant 
discharges). 
When pollutants are discharged, even on a continuous basis, into a 
lake, bay or coastal ocean waters (rather than into a flowing river or 
stream), the concentration of those discharged pollutants in any particular 
part of the receiving body of water depends upon several factors, such as 
the volume and concentration of the discharges in the wastewater from 
the defendant's facility, the volume of the water in the receiving body of 
water, the flow rate of water into and out of the receiving body of water, 
and the amounts of that type of pollutant being discharged into the 
receiving body of water by other persons. As a general rule, however, the 
concentration of the discharged pollutants should decrease the farther the 
pollutants travel from the point of discharge because the pollutants will 
be dispersed into larger volumes of water after discharge and some of the 
discharged pollutants may evaporate, settle to the bottom or be removed 
from the water by fish, wildlife, or plants. Consequently, the farther a 
place in or near a lake, bay or coastal waters is from the place where the 
pollutants were discharged, the less likely that a court will hold that place 
to be part of the area "affected" by the defendant's discharges. However, 
currents in a lake, bay or ocean coastal waters may affect the way in 
which discharged pollutants are dispersed in the receiving body of water, 
so some areas of such receiving bodies of water may have higher 
concentrations of discharged pollutants resulting from currents 
transporting pollutants. 
When pollutants are emitted into the outdoor ambient air, even on a 
continuous basis, the concentration of those emitted pollutants in the 
outdoor ambient air should decrease the farther the pollutants travel from 
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the facility that emitted the pollutants, as the pollutants disperse through 
greater volumes of outdoor ambient air and as some of those pollutants 
fall or precipitate back to earth. However, the concentration of a 
particular type of pollutant in a particular area's outdoor ambient air, after 
that type of pollutant has been emitted elsewhere from a particular 
facility, also will depend upon the height above ground at which 
pollutants are emitted from the facility into the outdoor ambient air (from 
a smokestack, vent or pipe), topographical characteristics of the area 
(such as mountains that may block the dispersion and transport of the 
pollutants), emissions of the same type of pollutant into the same air shed 
from other facilities, and prevailing winds. 
However, when pollutants emitted from a particular facility are 
continuously dispersed downwind by prevailing winds, areas that are 
upwind from the facility that emitted those pollutants should not have 
significant concentrations of those pollutants in the ambient air. 
Consequently, such upwind areas should not be considered to be 
"affected" by emissions from a facility located downwind, unless the 
upwind area is adjacent to or near the place where the emissions occur 
(so that persons using those upwind areas have lessened aesthetic or 
recreational enjoyment of the upwind area as a result of their viewing or 
smelling the defendant's emission of pollutants). 
As a general rule, as the distance increases between a particular 
geographical location and the place from where a defendant's challenged 
activity discharges pollutants into a surface body of water (or emits 
pollutants into the outdoor ambient air), the concentration of those 
discharged or emitted pollutants in the receiving body of water or 
ambient air should decrease continuously, becoming much lower than the 
pollutant concentration in the original discharge or emission. The 
concentration of the type of pollutant discharged or emitted may become 
so low in the outdoor air or water, at a specific distant location far from 
the place where the discharge or emission occurred, that either the 
presence of that pollutant may not be detected scientifically in any 
measurable amount, or the low amounts of the pollutant at a distant place 
may be found not to cause or threaten any harm to the environment or 
public health. In such a case, the distant location should not be 
considered to be an area "affected" by the defendant's discharges or 
emissions of pollutants at a distant facility. 
In LElidlaw, the most distant area affected by Laidlaw's pollutant 
discharges was forty miles away from Laidlaw's facility (where member 
Norman Sharp canoed forty miles downstream from the Laidlaw 
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facility.) 133 However, in other cases with different factual situations, a 
part of a river more than forty miles downstream from a defendant's 
facility that discharges pollutants into a river may be considered to be 
"affected" if that type of pollutant is found in measurable amounts in 
water that far downstream and those amounts lessen the aesthetic or 
recreational enjoyment of users of that area. Conversely, there may be 
other factual situations where a part of a river closer than forty miles 
downstream from a defendant's polluting facility is found not to be an 
area "affected" by the defendant's pollutant discharges. This may occur 
because the concentration of those pollutants in that part of the river 
either is so low as not to be detectable in any measurable amount or is so 
low as not to be harmful to human health or the environment. 
In cases where a plaintiff seeks standing to sue on the basis of 
recreational or aesthetic uses of a river that occur very far downstream 
from the place where the defendant's pollutant discharges occur, a court 
will have to decide not only if the plaintiff's downstream use occurs 
within the area "affected" by the defendant's pollutant discharges, but 
also whether the plaintiff satisfied the "fairly traceable" element of 
federal standing to sue requirements. This "fairly traceable" element 
requires a plaintiff to establish that there is a causal connection between 
the plaintiff's alleged injury in fact and the defendant's challenged 
pollutant discharges. 134 This element establishes that the plaintiff's injury 
is "fairly traceable" to the challenged activity of the defendant and is not 
the result of the independent action of some third person not before the 
court. 135 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw does not discuss whether the 
plaintiffs' affiant members satisfied the "fairly traceable" standing 
requirement. Nonetheless, a number of federal courts of appeals have 
held that the "fairly traceable" element is satisfied in a CWA citizen suit, 
against a defendant who is shown to have discharged a particular type of 
pollutant in violation of discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, when 
the plaintiff shows both (1) that the pollutants are discharged into a 
waterway in which the plaintiff has a recreational or aesthetic interest that 
is or may be adversely affected by that type of pollutant and (2) that that 
type of pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by 
the plaintiff. 136 Under this standard, a plaintiff can sue any person who is 
133. Id at 183. 
134. See Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
135. ld 
136. See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64, 72 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. demed, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991 ); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil 
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discharging that particular type of pollutant into a water body, even when 
there are several persons doing so, and can establish standing to sue by 
showing that the person sued has caused "some part" of the injury 
suffered by the plaintiff.'37 
Under this approach, the "fairly traceable" element is satisfied by 
evidence establishing that the body of water in which, or near where, the 
plaintiff engages in recreational activity, has been adversely affected in a 
manner that can be caused by the types of pollutants discharged by the 
defendant, without a need to show that each type of pollutant discharged 
by the defendant by itself has caused specific recreational or aesthetic 
injury to the plaintiff. For example, the "fairly traceable" element was 
held as satisfied when (1) the collective effects of a defendant's 
discharges of several different types of pollutants, in unlawful quantities 
in violation of several different effluent limitation parameters in its 
NPDES permit, interfered with the plaintiffs' fishing, swimming, and 
other recreational activities in and near the place where the defendant 
discharged pollutants (because of the unpleasant appearance and odors of 
the pollution) and (2) an expert witness for the plaintiffs testified that the 
effluents discharged by the defendant "may poison fish, render areas 
unsafe for people to swim, and generally limit the river as a fertile 
ground for recreation," without the need for "proof of this nature ... with 
respect to each individual parameter."138 
Additionally, the fairly traceable element was satisfied when a 
plaintiff's affiants, who engaged in recreational activities on the shores of 
a "heavily industrialized" stream within several miles of where the 
defendant discharged oil and grease into the stream in violation of 
discharge limitations in its NPDES permit, stated that the nearby waters 
of the stream had an oily or greasy sheen, thus permitting the court to 
conclude that the aesthetic injury suffered by the affiants "may be fairly 
traced to [the defendant's] effluent."139 On the other hand, "if a plaintiff 
has alleged ... that the waterway is unable to support aquatic life . . . , 
but failed to show that defendant's effluent contains pollutants that harm 
aquatic life, then plaintiffs would lack standing."140 
These courts of appeal adopted this approach on the grounds that 
the "fairly traceable" element does not require a plaintiff to "show to a 
Co., 73 E3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 E2d 974, 
980 (4th Cir. 1992). 
137. Powell Dufliyn Tennina/s, 913 E2d at 72 n.8. 
138. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
139. Powell Dufliyn Terminals, 913 E2d at 71-73 n.8. 
140. Jd at 72-73 n.8 (dictum). 
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scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's effluent 
alone, caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs,"'4 ' because "[i]f 
scientific certainty were the standard, then plaintiffs would be required to 
supply costly, strict proof of causation to meet a threshold jurisdictional 
requirement--even where ... the asserted cause of action [a defendant's 
alleged violation of discharge limitations in its CWA NPDES permit] 
does not itself require such proof."142 
This approach, however, may not be appropriate when the body of 
water into which the defendant discharges pollutants is so very large 
"that plaintiffs should rightfully demonstrate a more specific geographic 
or other causative nexus in order to satisfy the 'fairly traceable' element 
of standing."'43 Also, the approach would not be appropriate when the 
defendant discharges pollutants into a body of water that is not the water 
body used by the plaintiff for recreational activities and that does not 
have a direct hydrologic connection to that body of water.' 44 
The type of CWA or CAA violation allegedly committed by a 
defendant not only is a relevant factor in deciding if a plaintiff in a CWA 
or CAA citizen suit satisfies the "fairly traceable" element, but also is a 
relevant factor in determining if a specific place is part of the area 
"affected" by the defendant's challenged pollutant discharges or 
emissions. As discussed earlier, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in 
Laidlaw should be interpreted as requiring that the determination of 
whether an area is "affected" by the defendant's challenged activity 
should be based not only upon consideration of the distance between the 
place where the defendant's facility discharges pollutants and the place 
used by the plaintiff for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment, but also 
should be based upon the type of violation of the CWA or CAA allegedly 
committed by the defendant. 145 
141. Id at 72; Natural Res. De£ Council, Inc., 954 F.2d at 980. 
142. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F. 3d 149, 161 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (en bane). 
143. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 558 n.24 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(dictum). 
144. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 
1996) (holding that a fairly traceable element was not satisfied in a case where plaintiff's 
members used a body of water located three tributaries and eighteen miles away from the place 
where the defendant discharged pollutants, when there was no evidence demonstrating that 
pollutants discharged by the defendant made their way to the water body used by the plaintiff's 
members). The court held that the plaintiff's members' injuries could not be assumed to be fairly 
traceable to the defendant's discharges "solely on the basis of the observation that water runs 
downstream." Id at 362. 
145. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Ginsburg's opinion implicitly holds, however, that an area 
can be "affected" for purposes of the injury in fact principle without the 
environment of the area being harmed or degraded. In the standing to 
sue part of the Laidlaw opinion, Justice Ginsburg held that "[t]he relevant 
showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not injury to the 
environment but injury to the plaintiff."146 Consequently, Justice 
Ginsburg rejected Laidlaw's (and Justice Scalia's) argument, that FOE 
had no standing to sue for either injunctive relief or civil penalties when 
the suit was filed because the district court found that Laidlaw's 
discharges of mercury in violation of its CWA NPDES permit caused 
"'no demonstrated ... harm to the environment"' and "did not result in 
any health risk."147 Justice Ginsburg, in her majority opinion, responded 
to this argument by stating that insistence upon injury to the environment 
rather than injury to the plaintiff "is to raise the standing hurdle higher 
than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an action 
alleging noncompliance with an NPDES permit."148 
Justice Scalia, however, favored this argument made by Laidlaw, 
asserting in dissent Goined by Justice Thomas) that "[t]ypically, an 
environmental plaintiff claiming injury due to discharges in violation of 
the Clean Water Act argues that the discharges harm the environment, 
and that the harm to the environment injures him."149 Applying his "harm 
to the environment" standard to the facts in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia 
asserted that the plaintiffs in the Laidlaw case could not establish injury 
in fact for standing to sue purposes by the "typical" method, since the 
district court found that Laidlaw's discharges of pollutants did not harm 
either the environment or the North Tyger River and did not result in any 
health risk and that the overall quality of the water in the river exceeds 
the levels necessary to support recreation in and on the water. 150 Justice 
Scalia conceded that "[ w ]hile it is perhaps possible that a plaintiff could 
be harmed even though the environment was not, such a plaintiff would 
have the burden of articulating and demonstrating the nature of that 
injury."151 He argued, however, that in the Laidlaw case, the plaintiffs, in 
order to prove injury in fact to their members, should have introduced 
"evidence supporting the affidavits' bald assertions regarding decreasing 
146. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(2000). 
147. Jd (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. 
Supp. 588,602 (D.S.C. 1997)). 
148. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181. 
149. Jd at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
150. Id (citing Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. at 600, 602-03). 
151. Id at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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recreational usage and declining home values, as well as evidence for the 
improbable proposition that Laidlaw's violations, even though harmless 
to the environment, are somehow responsible for these effects."152 
Justice Ginsburg's "affected area" test for aesthetic and recreational 
injury in fact differs from Justice Scalia's statement of what he believes 
to be the correct legal principle for recreational and aesthetic injury in 
fact, by not explicitly requiring that the lessening of the plaintiff's 
recreational and aesthetic values in the affected area be caused by harm 
or changes to the environment of the affected area. Justice Ginsburg's 
test, while requiring that the plaintiff's physically use an area that is 
"affected" by the defendant's challenged activity, only requires that the 
plaintiff establish that the defendant's challenged activity lessens the 
aesthetic and recreational enjoyment that the plaintiff derives from that 
use.ls3 
Justice Scalia's test, on the other hand, requires that the plaintiff 
show that the defendant's discharges harm the environment of the area 
physically used by the plaintiff and that this environmental harm causes 
injury to the plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational enjoyment of the affected 
area. 154 Although Justice Ginsburg's test requires that the defendant's 
challenged activity "adversely affect" an area used by the plaintiff, her 
test does not require that those adverse effects on the affected area result 
in adverse effects on the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of 
the affected area. Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in 
Laidlaw implicitly holds that an area used by the plaintiff can be 
"adversely affected," within the meaning of her test for "injury in fact," 
even though there is no showing by the plaintiff of any harm to the 
environment, injury or risk to human health, or "harm" to the "affected 
area." 
Of course, both Justice Ginsburg's test and Justice Scalia's test in 
La1dlawwill be satisfied in a CWA citizen suit if a plaintiff can show that 
a defendant's discharges into a surface body of water not only violate 
effluent limitations in the facility's CWA NPDES permit, but also cause 
harm to the receiving body of water or other parts of the environment 
used by the plaintiffs, or adversely affect or threaten the health of the 
plaintiffs, because such "harm" certainly would "affect" the area. 
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Laidlaw held that the 
plaintiffs had standing to sue to seek both injunctive relief and civil 
penalties in an action against a defendant whose facility was alleged to be 
152. Id at 200 (citation omitted). 
153. Id at 183-85. 
154. Id at 199 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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in noncompliance with effluent limitations in a CWA NPDES permit. 155 
This decision should be interpreted as implicitly holding that any 
discharges of pollutants into a surface body of water that allegedly are in 
violation of effluent discharge limitations in a CWA NPDES permit 
"affect" "nearby" areas in the receiving body of water and its adjoining 
shoreline, for purposes of determining injury in fact for standing to sue 
purposes, even though those pollutant discharges do not cause a violation 
of water quality standards or otherwise harm or threaten to harm the 
environment or human health. 
Similarly, emissions of pollutants from a facility into the ambient air 
should be considered to sufficiently "affect" that ambient air to constitute 
injury in fact to persons who reside, work or engage in recreational 
activities "near," and downwind from, that facility (and who therefore 
may breath ambient air that contains pollutants emitted from the 
defendant's facility), when those emissions allegedly are in violation of 
emission limitations in the facility's CAA Title V permit. Consequently, 
under Justice Ginsburg's injury in fact test in Laidlaw, a plaintiff should 
have standing to sue in a citizen suit under section 304'56 of the CAA 
filed against a facility that allegedly is emitting pollutants into the 
ambient air in violation of emission limitations in that facility's CAA 
permit issued under Title V157 of the CAA, if the plaintiff is a person who 
uses areas "near" (or downwind from) the polluting facility for 
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment and if such enjoyment allegedly is 
lessened by the defendant's emissions of pollutants into the ambient air. 
A plaintiff should have standing in such a case even if the defendant's 
emissions do not cause CAA National Ambient Air Quality Standards to 
be violated in that area or region, and even though the defendant's 
pollutant emissions do not cause or threaten to cause any other harm to 
the environment or to public health. 
In addition, a particular area's outdoor ambient air should be 
considered to be "affected" by a defendant's emissions of pollutants into 
that air if the defendant's emissions cause a violation of a National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard in that particular area, even if the 
defendant's emissions do not violate emission limitations in a CAA Title 
V permit. Similarly, a part of a river should be considered to be 
"affected" by discharges of pollutants into that river from a defendant's 
facility located upstream, if those discharges cause a violation of a CWA 
water quality standard in that part of the river (regardiess of whether the 
155. Id at 189. 
156. 42 U.S. C. § 7604 (2000). 
157. Id §§ 7661-7661f. 
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defendant's pollutant discharges violate a discharge limitation in a CWA 
NPDES permit). 
However, Laidlaw does not make clear whether an area can be 
"affected" by a defendant in a CWA or CAA citizen suit who allegedly is 
violating monitoring, record-keeping, or reporting requirements in a 
CWA NPDES permit or CAA Title V permit, but who is not alleged to 
be violating CWA or CAA discharge or emission limitations or to be 
causing a violation of a CWA water quality standard or CAA ambient air 
quality standard. In such cases, an area may not be considered to be 
"affected" by the defendant's "challenged activity" if the defendant's 
"challenged activity" is considered to be the defendant's failure to 
comply with monitoring, reporting, or record-keeping requirements, as 
opposed to the defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions (which may 
be in compliance with the discharge or emission limitations in the 
defendant's CWA NPDES permit or CAA Title V permit). 158 However, if 
a plaintiff in such a case is not considered to suffer recreational or 
aesthetic injury under Laidlaws test for recreational and aesthetic injury 
in fact, the plaintiff may be able to establish the injury in fact element of 
federal standing to sue requirements on the basis of "informational 
injury"-the failure of the plaintiff to obtain information which must be 
publicly disclosed pursuant to statute/59 which arguably would include 
information required to be reported to governmental authorities and kept 
in records, and to be made available to members of the public, by the 
CWA160 and CAA. 161 
In the part of his statement asserting that "[t]ypically, an 
environmental plaintiff ... argues that the [defendant's] discharges harm 
the environment," Justice Scalia appears to require that the environment 
be harmed solely by defendant's discharges of pollutants. 162 This 
interpretation is supported by Justice Scalia's subsequent statement in his 
158. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 E2d 1109, 1112-13 (4th Cir. 1988). The 
Simkins Industries decision, issued many years prior to the Supreme Court's Laidlaw decision, 
held that a defendant's violation of provisions in its NPDES permit, requiring it to monitor and 
report its discharges of pollutants into a river, caused injury in fact to the interests of the plaintiffs' 
members in protecting the environmental integrity of the river and curtailing ongoing unlawful 
discharges by the defendant into that river. Id Simkins Industries may not be consistent with 
Laidlaw, because it does not state how the defendant's monitoring and reporting violations 
"affected" the area of the river or surrounding areas used by the plaintiffs' members that were 
near the place where the defendant discharged pollutants into the river. 
159. Fed. Election Comm'n v.Adkins, 524 U.S. 11,21 (1998). 
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (2000). 
161. 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (2000). 
162. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 199 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (2000). 
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Laidlaw dissent, that if the river was in a polluted condition, "this 
condition, if present, was surely not caused by Laidlaw's discharges, 
which according to the District Court 'did not result in any health risk or 
environmental harm.'"163 If Justice Scalia requires a showing that a 
defendant's pollutant discharges by themselves cause harm to the 
environment, he would hold that a plaintiff does not establish injury in 
fact where the environment is harmed by the cumulative impact of the 
pollutant discharges of a number of different facilities, but where the 
defendant's discharges by themselves would not be sufficient to cause the 
harm to the environment. 
Quite often, the quality of surface bodies of water or ambient air is 
degraded by the cumulative effects of the discharges or emissions of 
pollutants into the air or water by numerous facilities whose discharges 
or emissions individually would not cause water or ambient air quality 
standards to be exceeded or the environment or public health to be 
harmed or threatened. 
Under Justice Ginsburg's test, any person who recreationally or 
aesthetically uses an area near a facility that allegedly is emitting 
pollutants into air or water in violation of either a CWA NPDES permit 
or a CAA Title V permit can have standing to sue in a CWA or CAA 
citizen suit. The plaintiff could sue regardless of whether the defendant's 
pollutant discharges or emissions by themselves are the cause of a 
violation of a water or air quality standard in the receiving body of water 
or ambient air, or of other harm or threatened harm to the environment or 
public health. Justice Scalia's approach to injury in fact, on the other 
hand, if interpreted as only granting standing to sue to a plaintiff in a 
CWA or CAA citizen suit against a polluter whose pollutant discharges 
or emissions by themselves cause water or air quality standards to be 
violated or the environment or public health to be harmed or threatened, 
would grant standing to citizens in CWA and CAA citizen suits only in 
the most egregious cases of water and air pollution. 
Justice Ginsburg's test for injury in fact, because it only requires a 
defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions to "affect" an area used by 
the plaintiff and to "lessen" the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic 
enjoyment of that area, grants federal court jurisdiction over CWA and 
CAA citizen suits against polluters whose individual contributions to 
water and air pollution problems may not be substantial, but whose 
discharges or emissions contribute to adverse environmental effects 
caused by the cumulative effects of the discharges or emissions of several 
163. Id at 200. 
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or even numerous polluting facilities. Her injury in fact test does not 
require a defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions to harm or 
threaten to harm either the environment or public health, and does not 
require that the defendant's discharges or emissions by themselves injure 
or harm the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected 
area."'64 
After stating that the sworn affidavits and depositions of members 
of the plaintiff organizations "adequately documented" injury in fact to 
those members' recreational, aesthetic and economic interests, 165 Justice 
Ginsburg appears to hold in Laidlaw that the plaintiffs' members had 
standing to seek injunctive relief because they established that they 
would suffer future imminent injury in fact both through ( 1) their 
statements that they were refraining from using the river and its 
surrounding areas for recreation because of their concerns about the 
effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges166 and (2) their conditional 
statements that they would use the "nearby" river for recreation in the 
future if the defendant's pollutant discharges ceased. 167 
This interpretation of Laidlaw would establish a new, additional 
standard for recreational and aesthetic injury in fact that permits the 
injury in fact element to be satisfied in a suit seeking injunctive relief by 
a person who has neither actually engaged in physical use of the affected 
area in the past nor alleged that he or she will physically use the affected 
area in the imminent near future, based upon two aspects of the Laidlaw 
case. The first aspect of the case supporting this interpretation is that the 
members' affidavits and depositions, which Justice Ginsburg held 
"adequately documented" injury in fact, attested to injuries both (1) from 
the members refraining from recreational uses of the river and 
164. In a decision issued prior to the Supreme Court's Laidlaw decision, the Fourth Circuit 
held that 
[t]o establish standing to redress an environmental injury, plaintiffs need not show that 
a particular defendant is the only cause of their irijury, and that, therefore, absent the 
defendant's activities, the plaintiffs would enjoy undisturbed use of a resource .... 
Instead, to meet the "fairly traceable" requirement ... , plaintiffs must merely show that 
a defendant discharges a pollutant that "causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries 
alleged by the plaintiffs." 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). 
Quoting from UiltkllJs, the Fourth Circuit similarly has stated that "[r]ather than pinpointing the 
origins of particular molecules, a plaintiff 'must merely show that a defendant discharges a 
pollutant that causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged' in the specific geographic area 
of concern." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F. 3d 149, 151, 161 
(4th Cir. 2000) (en bane) (alteration in original). 
165. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183-84. 
166. /d at 184-85. 
167. /d at 184. 
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surrounding areas (because of their reasonable fears of the effects of the 
defendant's pollutant discharges), and (2) from the members' conditional 
commitment to future recreational uses of the river if the defendant's 
discharges of pollutants into the river ceased. 168 The second aspect of the 
case is that Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Laidlaw does not 
explicitly state that the injury in fact element for standing for injunctive 
relief was satisfied solely by either the members refraining from 
recreational use of the river (because of their fears about the effects of the 
defendant's pollutant discharges) or the members' conditional commit-
ments to future recreational uses of the river if the defendant's pollutant 
discharges into the river ceased. 
Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw appears to have held that sufficient 
injury in fact for injunctive relief was shown by the members' 
"conditional statements-that they would use the nearby North Tyger 
River for recreation if Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into it."169 
Although Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly state that these intended 
future uses established the injury in fact element for standing to sue for 
injunctive relief, as opposed to standing to sue for civil penalties (another 
form of relief sought by the plaintiffs in the suit), this interpretation 
follows implicitly from Justice Ginsburg's statement: "Nor can the 
affiants' conditional statements-that they would use the nearby North 
Tyger River for recreation if Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into 
it-be equated with the speculative "'some day" intentions' to visit 
endangered species halfway around the world that [the Supreme Court] 
. . . held insufficient to show injury in fact in [Lujan v.} Defenders of 
Wildhfe'' 70-which apparently caused the Court in Defenders ofWildlife 
to deny the plaintiff organizations standing to sue for injunctive relief.' 7 ' 
In Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiffs, who were seeking injunctive 
relief that would extend the protection of section 7172 of the United States 
Endangered Species Act to species in foreign countries, were denied 
standing.173 The plaintiffs alleged that they intended "some day" to make 
return visits to foreign countries they had previously visited to observe 
particular endangered species. 174 The Court held that these allegations 
did not establish the imminent future injury required to obtain standing to 
168. Id at 182-83. 
169. Id at 184. 
170. Id (citation omitted). 
171. Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
172. 1~ u.s.c. § 1536 (2000). 
173. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U.S. at 564. 
174. Id 
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sue in a suit seeking injunctive relief. 175 The Court in Defenders of 
Wildlife stated: 
[T]he affiants' profession of an "inten[t]" to return to the places they had 
visited before [Egypt and Sri Lanka ]-where they will presumably, this 
time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered 
species-is simply not enough. Such "some day" intentions-without any 
description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specifications of when 
the some day will be--do not support a fmding of the "actual or imminent" 
injury that our cases require. . . . "[I]mminence" . . . has been stretched 
beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury 
at some indefmite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury 
happen are at least partly within the plaintiff's own control. In such 
circumstances we have insisted that the injury proceed with a high degree 
of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no 
injury would have occurred at all. 176 
In his dissenting opinion in Defenders of Wildlife, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that the majority was requiring that the members purchase 
airplane tickets to Egypt and Sri Lanka in order to obtain standing to sue 
to seek injunctive relief. 177 
In Laidlaw, however, members of the plaintiff organization who 
either lived near the Laidlaw facility (within one-quarter mile to twenty 
miles away) or who in the past had engaged in recreational activities on 
the river forty miles downstream from Laidlaw's facility, apparently had 
standing to sue to seek injunctive relief based upon their allegations that 
"they would use the nearby North Tyger River for recreation if Laidlaw 
were not discharging pollutants into it."178 
In this holding, Justice Ginsburg made no reference to these 
members having any plans to use the river for recreational purposes at 
any specific date in the imminent near future, as Defenders of Wildlife 
seemingly requires in order for a plaintiff to establish standing to sue in a 
suit seeking injunctive relief. Justice Ginsburg apparently did not require 
the Laidlaw plaintiffs to show that their members had concrete and 
specific plans to use the river on specific dates in the future because the 
members in Laidlaw were "nearby" the North Tyger River, as opposed to 
175. ld 
176. ld at 564-65 n.2 (citations omitted). 
177. See id at 592 (Biaclanun, J., dissenting). 
178. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 
(2000). These members' standing to sue for injunctive relief also may have been based upon their 
refraining from using the river and its surrounding areas for recreational activities, both at the 
time the suit was filed and in the imminent near future, because of their reasonl!ble concern.s 
about the effects of the defendant's discharges. See discussion infia notes 187-218 and 
accompanying text. 
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the plaintiffs in Defenders of WJ1dlife who alleged only that they would 
travel "halfway around the world" '"some day."'' 79 She also may not have 
required specific and concrete plans for future use of the river on a 
specific date because the members' alleged future uses of the river were 
conditional upon defendant Laidlaw stopping its discharges into the river, 
an act that had not happened at the time the complaint was filed and 
these members were deposed. 180 
Laidlaw, therefore, might be interpreted as holding that a person 
who resides "nearby" both the area affected by the defendant's 
challenged activity and the site of the defendant's challenged discharge or 
emission of pollutants, has standing to sue to seek injunctive relief 
against the defendant's challenged activity, by showing that (1) in the 
imminent future he or she will use the affected area for a specified 
recreational use (such as fishing, swimming or boating) if the defendant's 
challenged activity ceases and (2) he or she will refrain from using the 
affected area for recreational activities until the defendant's illegal 
pollutant discharges cease--even if the plaintiff has never used the 
affected area in the past for that or any other recreational purpose. 
The Laidlaw decision however, does not define "nearby." The 
members described by Justice Ginsburg in her opinion in Laidlaw either 
resided one-quarter mile to twenty miles from the Laidlaw facility or in 
the past had canoed in the North Tyger River forty miles downstream of 
the Laidlaw facility.' 8' Under Laidlaw, therefore, persons who either 
reside or engage in recreational activities within forty miles of the 
defendant's challenged activity, arguably have standing to sue to seek 
injunctive relief against the defendant's challenged activity simply by 
alleging that in the future he or she will engage in specified recreational 
activities in the "affected" area, if the defendant's challenged activity 
ceases, with no necessity to specify a particular date for such future 
recreational activities and with no need to have engaged in that or any 
other recreational activity in the "affected" area at any time in the past. 182 
Apparently, Justice Ginsburg believes that absent proof of facts to 
the contrary, a court can presume the truthfulness of allegations of a 
179. ld at 184 (quoting Detendemofl*ldlite, 504 U.S. at 564). 
180. Id at 179. 
181. Member Judy Pruitt lived one-quarter mile from the Laidlaw facility, member Lee 
Curtis lived one-half mile from the facility, member Angela Patterson lived two miles from the 
facility, and member Linda Moore lived twenty miles from the facility, while member Norman 
Sharp had canoed forty miles downstream from the facility. Id at 181-83. 
182. In Laidlaw, members Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela Patterson, and Norman Sharp had 
engaged in past recreational uses in or along the affected river, but members Judy Pruitt and 
Linda Moore did not allege or establish any prior recreational uses of the river. Jd 
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person that he or she in the future will engage in recreational uses of a 
"nearby" affected area if the defendant's challenged pollution or 
degradation of that area ceases, if that person resides "near" the affected 
area and within forty miles of the defendant's challenged activity and that 
person states that he or she presently does not engage in recreational 
activities in the "affected" area because of reasonable concerns about the 
effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges. 
However, if such a person has never in the past engaged in any 
recreational activity in the "affected" area--or any other area, or if such 
person's sedentary lifestyle or poor physical condition indicate that the 
person is unlikely in the future to engage in any outdoor recreational 
activities in the affected area--or any other place, a court might decline 
to accept as true that person's allegations and sworn statements attesting 
that the person in the future will engage in specified recreational 
activities in the affected area if the defendant's unlawful pollution in that 
area ceases. 
Laidlaw, however, provides no guidelines indicating when 
prospective future users of an affected area will be considered to be users 
of a "nearby area" within Laidlauls holding, and therefore not subject to 
Defenders of Wildlife's requirement that prospective future users of an 
affected area must show specific and concrete plans to use the affected 
area in the imminent future. 
Defenders of Wildlife's requirement may not be limited just to 
situations where a person simply alleges plans to visit an area in a foreign 
country that is more than halfway around the world. The Court's concern 
in Laidlaw and Defenders of Wildlife was "to reduce the possibility of 
deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all" (because 
the plaintiff's alleged future use was too "speculative" and "indefinite" as 
to when it would occur). 183 A court, therefore, may decide that there are 
other factual situations, including some involving alleged future plans to 
visit areas within the United States, that should be subject to the 
"concrete and specific plans" requirements of Defenders of Wildlife. 
A court, in deciding whether a plaintiff alleging an imminent future 
use of an affected area should be subject to Defenders of Wildlife's 
requirements of showing specific and concrete plans, should consider not 
only the distance that will be involved in the plaintiff traveling to that 
area, but also should consider other factors that are relevant to 
determining whether a plaintiff probably will visit the affected area in the 
imminent future as he or she has alleged. Although a past visit is neither 
183. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2. 
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sufficient by itself184 nor required185 to establish standing to sue in a suit 
seeking injunctive relief, a plaintiff's past recreational uses of, or visits 
to, the affected area should support the plaintiff's allegations if those 
visits have been on a regular or periodic basis in the past that makes a 
repeat visit in the near future a likely event. 
Daily geographical proximity ... may make actual past recreational use 
less important in substantiating an "injury in fact," because a person who 
lives quite nearby is likely to notice and care about the physical beauty of 
an area he passes often. . . . On the other hand, a person who uses an area 
for recreational purposes does not have to show that he or she lives 
particularly nearby to establish an injury-in-fact due to possible or feared 
environmental degradation. Repeated recreational use itself, accompanied 
by a credible allegation of desired future use, can be sufficient, even if 
relatively infrequent, to demonstrate that environmental degradation of the 
area is injurious to that person. . . . An individual who visits Yosemite 
National Park once a year to hike or rock climb and regards that visit as the 
highlight of his year is not precluded from litigating to protect the 
environmental quality of Yosemite Valley simply because he cannot visit 
more often. 186 
However, if a plaintiff has never engaged in recreational activities in 
the affected area because of reasonable concerns about the effects of the 
defendant's pollutant discharges on the plaintiff's health, the plaintiff's 
failure in the past to have engaged in recreational activities in the affected 
area should not be considered a negative factor in determining if the 
plaintiffhas established imminent future injury in fact. 
In deciding whether a plaintiff has established an imminent future 
use of the affected area, a court also should consider the cost that a 
plaintiff will incur to visit the affected area in the imminent future, and 
the availability of resources to the plaintiff to pay those costs. A court 
also should consider any legal obstacles (e.g., visa requirements or 
governmental travel bans) that might impede the plaintiff's efforts to visit 
the affected area, and any logistical problems that the plaintiff might face 
in seeking to visit the affected area in the imminent future (such as 
difficult means of traveling to the area, particularly if extended hiking or 
184. /dat564. 
185. This is an implicit holding of Lai'd/awbecause Justice Ginsburg made no reference to 
the affiant members attesting that they would again use areas in and near the river for recreational 
purposes if Laidlaw's pollutant discharges into it stopped and only three of the affiant members 
(Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela Patterson, and Norman Sharp) attested to having previously engaged 
in recreational activities in or near the river. 528 U.S. at 181-83. 
186. Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
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climbing might be required in order for the plaintiff to reach the area). A 
court also should consider the plaintiff's lifestyle and personal 
characteristics in determining if the plaintiff is likely to visit the affected 
area in the imminent near future. For example, if the plaintiff is a "couch 
potato" in poor physical condition who has never (or not for many years) 
engaged in outdoor hiking and camping activities, a court might decline 
to accept as true that person's allegations that he or she will soon climb to 
the top of Mount Everest (particularly if the cost of doing so by means of 
a private expedition would be well beyond the financial resources 
available to that person). 
Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw also held that the plaintiff organizations 
showed injury in fact by establishing that the defendant's "continuous and 
pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river"187 caused the affiant 
members to have "reasonable concerns about the effects of those 
discharges"188 and reasonable fears that "led the affiants to respond to that 
concededly ongoing conduct by refraining from use of the North Tyger 
River and surrounding areas" and caused these "nearby residents to 
curtail their recreational use of [the river and] ... subject[ ed] them to 
other economic and aesthetic harms."189 Justice Ginsburg held that 
because Laidlaw's unlawful discharges of pollutants in violation of its 
NPDES permit was occurring at the time the complaint was filed, "the 
only 'subjective' issue [presented in the case was] . . . '[t]he 
reasonableness of [the] fear' that led the affiants to respond to that ... 
conduct by refraining from use of the North Tyger River and surrounding 
areas."190 
Justice Ginsburg never explicitly explained why the court found it 
necessary to find this injury in fact from the affiant members' refraining 
from use of the river and its surrounding areas, when the Court 
apparently already had found that the affiants had established injury in 
fact for purposes of standing to seek injunctive relief, on the basis of their 
statements that in the future they would use the river for recreation if 
Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants into the river. However, she may 
have done so because she found that imminent future injury in fact for 
standing for injunctive relief was established by both the members 
refraining from recreational use of the river (because of their reasonable 
fears of the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges) and by the 
members' conditional commitment to use the river for recreational 
187. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
188. Id at 183-84. 
189. Id at 184. 
190. /d 
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purposes in the future if the defendant's pollutant discharges into the river 
ceased. 
Although the affiants' conduct in refraining from using the river and 
surrounding areas because of the defendant's pollutant discharges can be 
characterized as a past injury (which the Court previously held to be 
insufficient injury in fact in a suit seeking injunctive relief),'9 ' the 
members' conduct in refraining from recreational use of the river and its 
surrounding area also can be characterized as a continuing present injury 
and as an imminent future injury, which are sufficient to establish 
standing to sue to seek injunctive relief. 192 
Justice Ginsburg may have identified this injury resulting from the 
affiants' conduct in refraining from using the river and surrounding areas 
until the trial court issued its judgment, at least in part to establish the 
plaintiffs' past injury in fact that was necessary in order for them to have 
standing to seek the assessment of civil penalties. The affiants' alleged 
future injury, while sufficient to establish the plaintiffs' standing to sue to 
seek injunctive relief, probably was insufficient to establish the plaintiffs' 
standing to sue to seek civil penalties, because past injury in fact is 
necessary to establish standing to sue to seek damages (and civil 
penalties arguably are analogous to damages). Justice Ginsburg there-
fore, at least in part, may have noted the affiants' refraining from 
recreational use of the river to identify a past injury to the affiants, 
because it was necessary to do so in order for the affiants to have 
standing to sue to seek civil penalties for the defendant's illegal pollutant 
discharges that occurred in the past (and continued until after the 
plaintiffs filed the complaint in the action). 
Another possible interpretation of this part of the Lakllawopinion is 
that Justice Ginsburg considered the members' conduct, in refraining 
from recreational use of the "affected" area because of their concern 
about the effects of the defendant's discharges, to be a future imminent 
injury that helped to establish (in conjunction with the members' 
conditional statement about future recreational use if the defendants' 
pollutant discharges ceased) the plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive 
relief. Under this interpretation, the plaintiffs' injury, resulting from their 
refraining from recreational use of the river and its surrounding areas 
because of their reasonable concern about the effects of the defendant's 
pollutant discharges, would be considered a future imminent injury that 
191. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 
192. See Lujan v. Defender ofWi1dlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.8 (1992). 
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helped to show that the members sufficiently established standing to seek 
injunctive relief. 
This interpretation is supported by Justice Ginsburg's statement in 
Laidlaw, immediately after her statement that injury in fact was 
established by the members refraining from using the river and its 
surrounding areas because of their concerns about Laidlaw's pollutant 
discharges, that "Laidlaw argues next that even if FOE had standing to 
seek injunctive relief, it lacked standing to seek civil penalties. Here the 
asserted defect is not injury but redressability."'93 This latter statement 
might be interpreted as indicating that the Court's holding, that injury in 
fact resulted from the affiants refraining from recreational use of the 
river, should be interpreted as relevant to the affiants' standing to sue to 
seek injunctive relief, not their standing to seek civil penalties. This 
interpretation also is supported by Justice Ginsburg's discussion of the 
Court's holding in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,194 which she referred to 
as holding that the "plaintiff lacked standing to seek an injunction."195 In 
this part of her opinion Justice Ginsburg concluded that the plaintiffs' 
members established injury in fact by showing that their reasonable fear 
about the effects of the defendant's pollutant discharges caused them to 
refrain from recreational use of the river and surrounding areas. 196 
Under this alternative reading, the Laidlaw opinion is interpreted as 
holding that the plaintiffs' members established the injury in fact 
element, for purposes of establishing standing to seek injunctive relief, 
both ( 1) because of their refraining in the imminent near future from 
using the river for recreational purposes because of their reasonable 
concern about the defendant's pollutant discharges and (2) because of 
their statements that in the future they would use the river for recreational 
purposes if the defendant ceased discharging pollut4nts into it. Of 
course, Laidlaw under this interpretation might be considered as also 
holding that the members' conduct in refraining from using the river in 
the past established a past injury in fact that sufficiently established the 
members' standing to seek civil penalties for the defendant's past 
violations of its NPDES permit. 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw did not identify the type of 
harm or risk of harm the affiant members reasonably feared from the 
defendant's discharges of pollutants into the river. The affiant members 
(Kenneth Lee Curtis, Angela Patterson, and Linda Moore) who allegedly 
193. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185. 
194. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.7. 
195. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. 
196. Id at 184-85. 
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would swim or wade in the river if it was not polluted, may have feared 
adverse effects on their health if they swam in the river when it contained 
harmful pollutants discharged by the defendant, although Justice 
Ginsburg did not explicitly make any such finding in Laidlaw. The 
members (Kenneth Lee Curtis and Judy Pruitt) who allegedly would fish 
in the river (and who presumably might eat fish caught from the river), 
also might have feared adverse effects on their health if they ate fish 
from the river containing harmful pollutants-although Justice Ginsburg 
did not make any such explicit finding in the Laidlawcase. 197 
However, Justice Ginsburg did not explicitly hold that any of the 
affiant members in Laidlaw suffered injury in fact because of harm or 
adverse effects, or risk of harm or adverse effects, to their health. In fact, 
none of the affiant members in Laidlaw alleged that they suffered injury 
in fact because of harm or risk of harm to their health caused by the 
defendant's discharges of pollutants into the river. No allegations of 
injury to the affiants' health may have been made in the plaintiff's 
complaint in Laidlaw because of concerns that proximate causation 
requirements would make it difficult to establish the truthfulness of such 
allegations if the defendant challenged such allegations of injury to 
health in a motion for summary judgment. 
But even if some of the affiant members declined to swim, wade or 
fish in the river because of fear of harm to their health, or did not engage 
in other recreational activities, such as boating or canoeing, in or near the 
river, because of concerns about harm to their health, the injury that such 
a member would suffer should still be considered to be an injury to a 
recreational or aesthetic interest (not just an injury to health). This 
conclusion should be reached because a reasonable concern about a 
person's health would be the reason why the person declined to engage in 
the particular recreational activity (that also might provide the person 
aesthetic pleasure, as may be the case with bird-watching and many other 
outdoor activities that might be characterized as a "recreational 
activity"). 
Of course, there may be cases where a person declines to engage in 
an outdoor recreational activity in or near a polluted river not because of 
any concerns that doing so will result in harm to that person's health, but 
because of concerns that the smell or color of the river's polluted water 
will cause a particular outdoor recreational activity in or near the river 
either not to be an enjoyable recreational experience or not to be an 
experience that will provide aesthetic enjoyment. In such cases, such 
197. Id at 181-83. 
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person would also suffer a recreational or aesthetic injury in fact that 
would be sufficient to satisfy federal standing to sue requirements. 
Consequently, under Justice Ginsburg's decision in Laidlaw, a 
person should be considered to have suffered a recreational or aesthetic 
injury in fact when the person declines to engage in a specified 
recreational activity in or near a river because of the defendant's 
discharges of pollutants into the river, either because of reasonable 
concerns or fears that the activity will not be an enjoyable recreational 
activity (or will not be an aesthetically enjoyable activity) or because of 
reasonable concerns or fears that the activity will harm or risk harm to 
the person's health. 
Justice Ginsburg based this "reasonableness of fear" standard on 
Lyons, which she described as holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to 
sue to seek an injunction against the enforcement of a police choke-hold 
policy because he did not establish that he reasonably feared being the 
victim of such unlawful conduct in the future, since there was no 
evidence of recurrence of this unlawful conduct against the plaintiff or a 
realistic threat to the plaintiff from this policy. 198 Justice Ginsburg stated 
that Lyons' "'subjective apprehensions' that such a recurrence would 
even take place were not enough to support standing."199 She then held in 
Laidlaw that under Lyons the only subjective issue in the case was the 
reasonableness of the affiants' fears and that the Court in Laidlaw found 
nothing "'improbable' about the proposition that a company's continuous 
and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river would cause 
nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway and 
would subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms."200 She 
concluded by stating that "[t]he proposition is entirely reasonable, the 
District Court found it was true in this case, and that is enough for injury 
in fact."201 
Justice Ginsburg did not state that the affiant members, in order to 
establish a reasonable concern or fear· about the effects of Laidlaw's 
pollutant discharges, had to establish either that they had specific 
knowledge of the types and amount of pollutants being discharged by the 
Laidlaw facility, or that they had a reasonable belief that Laidlaw's 
pollutant discharges were in violation of discharge limitations in 
Laidlaw's CWA NPDES permit. Affiant member Kenneth Lee Curtis 
only attested that "he was concerned that the water [in the river] was 
198. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107-08. 
199. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108 n.8). 
200. Id 
201. Id at 184-85. 
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polluted by Laidlaw's discharges," and that he did not fish "at a specific 
spot [in the river] . . . because of his concerns about Laidlaw's 
discharges."202 Affiant member Angela Patterson stated that she would 
like to engage in various recreational activities "in or near the river 
because she was concerned about harmful effects from discharged 
pollutants; and that she and her husband would like to purchase a home 
near the river but did not intend to do so, in part because of Laidlaw's 
discharges."203 Affiant member Judy Pruitt similarly averred that she 
would like to engage in various recreational activities along the river "but 
has refrained from those activities because of the discharges."204 Affiant 
member Linda Moore similarly attested that she would engage in a 
number of different types of recreational activities "were it not for her 
concerns about illegal discharges."205 However, none of the affiant 
members described by Justice Ginsburg referred either to mercury or any 
other specific type of pollutant allegedly discharged by Laidlaw, or stated 
that they believed that Laidlaw's discharges were in violation of 
discharge limitations in its CWA NPDES permit. Although affiant 
member Moore referred to "illegal discharges," her statements do not 
indicate either that she was referring to the defendant's discharges as 
being illegal or why she believed that the discharges were illegal.206 The 
other five affiant members, who were held to have established injury in 
fact, made no references to "illegal" discharges by the defendant. 
Consequently, a person, in order to establish recreational or 
aesthetic injury in fact under Laidlaw, apparently only needs to allege 
and establish that they have general knowledge that the defendant in a 
CWA citizen suit is discharging some type(s) of pollutant(s) into a river 
or other body of water and that they do not engage in recreational 
activities in or near that body of water because of concern about the 
effects of those pollutant discharges on their health or aesthetic or 
recreational enjoyment if she did engage in such activities. 
In dissent, Justice Scalia in Laidlaw asserted that "[ o ]ngoing 
'concerns' about the environment are not enough [to show injury in fact], 
for '[i]t is the realiry-ofthe threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the 
standing inquiry, not the plaintiff's subjective apprehensions."'207 The 
"reality of the threat" language quoted by Justice Scalia in this statement 
202. Id at 182. 
203. Id 
204. Id 
205. Id 
206. Id 
207. Id at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
107 n.8 (1983)). 
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comes from a footnote in Lyons that is the same source of Justice 
Ginsburg's "reasonableness of [the] fear" standard upon which she relied 
to hold that the affiant members established recreational and aesthetic 
injury in fact by showing that they refrained from recreational use of the 
river and surrounding areas because of their reasonable fears and 
concerns about the effects of the defendant's discharges of pollutants into 
the river.208 
Justice Scalia's dissent does not oppose the application of a test for 
recreational and aesthetic injury in fact that is based on Lyons, but rather 
interprets Lyons as requiring injury in fact that is based on concerns that 
reflect the true reality of environmental harm and pollution in an area, 
when injury in fact is based on a person•s refraining from recreational use 
of an area because of the person's concerns about the effects of a 
defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions. Justice Ginsburg, on the 
other hand, interprets Lyons as making the reasonableness of a person's 
concerns, not the true reality of environmental harm and pollution, the 
determinative issue in such situations in determining whether the injury 
in fact element is satisfied when a person refrains from recreational use 
of an area because of concerns or fears about the effects of the 
defendant's pollution discharges or emissions. Of course, under Justice 
Ginsburg's approach, reasonable people can disagree about whether an 
individual's concerns about the effects of a defendant's pollutant 
discharges or emissions are "reasonable fears" or unreasonable 
"subjective apprehensions." Justice Scalia's dissent, in part, may be 
based on his belief that the affiant members' concerns were unreasonable 
"subjective apprehensions," not "reasonable fears." 
This interpretation of his dissent is supported by his statements that 
the affiants "rely entirely upon unsupported and unexplained affidavit 
allegations of 'concern"'209 and "have established nothing but 'subjective 
apprehensions."'210 He first noted that although affiant member Moore 
208. /d at 184 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at I 07 n.8). The footnote in Lyons upon which 
both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia relied states: 
Lyons alleged that he feared he would be choked in any future encounter with the 
police. The reasonableness of Lyons' fear is dependent upon the likelihood of a 
recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct. It is the reali(Y of the threat of repeated 
injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff's subjective 
apprehensions. The emotional consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient 
basis for an injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the 
defendant. 
461 U.S. at 107 n.8. 
209. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 200 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
210. /dat201. 
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stated that she would use the river for recreation if she was not concerned 
about the pollution, she also had only been to the river twice (once before 
the suit was filed and once afterwards). 211 Similarly, Justice Scalia noted 
that affiant member Curtis had admitted that he had not been to the river 
since he was a "kid" and also had stated that the reason he had not been 
to the river since then was not because ofpollution.212 Justice Scalia also 
asserted that although Curtis had claimed that the river looked and 
smelled polluted, "this condition, if present, was surely not caused by 
Laidlaw's discharges, which according to the District Court 'did not 
result in any health risk or environmental harm."'213 Justice Scalia also 
asserted that the other affiants only "established nothing but 'subjective 
apprehensions'" in stating "either that they would use the river if it were 
not polluted or harmful (as the court subsequently found it is not) ... or 
said that the river looks polluted (which is also incompatible with the 
court's findings)."214 
Justice Scalia also argued that although the district court found that 
the plaintiffs had standing to sue in 1993, this initial conclusion that the 
plaintiff had standing should be re-examined because of the district 
court's later finding in 1997 that Laidlaw's discharges did not harm the 
environment.215 He contended that the Court in Laidlawwas "content" to 
base standing on "'conclusory allegations of an affidavit,"'216 which the 
Court had refused to do in National WJldlife Federation. 217 Justice Scalia 
concluded this argument as follows: 
By accepting plaintiffs' vague, contradictory, and unsubstantiated allega-
tions of "concern" about the environment as adequate to prove injury in 
fact, and accepting them even in the face of a fmding that the environment 
was not demonstrably harmed, the Court makes the injury-in-fact 
requirement a sham. If there are permit violations, and a member of a 
plaintiff environmental organization lives near the offending plant, it would 
be difficult not to satisfy today's lenient standard.218 
Although Justice Scalia based these arguments on the true reality of 
the environmental harm and pollution in the area near the defendant's 
pollutant discharges, rather than on the reasonableness of the affiant 
members' concerns, Justice Scalia properly focused on a person's past 
211. Id 
212. Jd 
213. Jd (citation omitted). 
214. Jd at 200-01. 
215. Id at 201. 
216. Id (quoting Lujan v. Nat'! Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). 
217. Nat'/ Wildlik Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 888. 
218. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
112 TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17 
use of an affected area. This focus determines whether that person is 
truthfully alleging either that she will use that particular area in the future 
for a particular outdoor recreational activity if the defendant ceases 
unlawful discharges of pollutants or that she has not been using the 
affected area for a particular outdoor recreational activity because of the 
person's concern about the defendant's discharges of pollutants. A court 
does not have to believe that such allegations are truthful when the 
person making such allegations in the past has not frequently, or ever, 
engaged in such recreational activities in the affected area (or anywhere 
else). A court in a particular case may find that a person, who alleges 
that she has not engaged in specific recreational activities in or near a 
particular body of water because of concerns about the adverse effects 
that would result from the defendant's pollutant discharges if she did so, 
in fact did not engage in such recreational activities in or near the body of 
water because she does not enjoy such outdoor recreational activities and 
does not engage in such activities even if given the time and opportunity 
to do so. 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Laidlaw did not discuss whether the 
plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief satisfied the redressability element 
of federal standing to sue requirements. This element has been held to be 
satisfied in a CWA citizen suit seeking injunctive relief against a 
defendant alleged to be violating effiuent limitations in its NPDES 
permit, on the grounds that an injunction will reduce, at least in part, the 
plaintiff's recreational and aesthetic injuries caused by the defendant's 
illegal discharges, by reducing the pollution in the receiving body of 
water.219 A plaintiff in such a case "need not show that the waterway will 
be returned to pristine condition in order to satisfy" the redressability 
element.220 
In the final portion of the part of her majority opinion addressing 
the plaintiff's standing to sue, Justice Ginsburg in Laidlaw held that the 
plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties, against a defendant who allegedly was 
committing an NPDES permit violation at the time the citizen suit was 
filed, satisfied the redressability element of constitutional standing to sue 
requirements, because potential sanctions of civil penalties both 
"encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them 
from committing future ones," thus "afford[ing] redress to citizen 
plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of 
219. See Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn Terminals, Inc., 913 
F.2d 64,73 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991). 
220. Id 
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ongoing lawful conduct."111 Justice Ginsburg distinguished Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, where the Supreme Court held that 
citizen plaintiffs did not satisfy the redressability element of standing to 
sue requirements in a citizen suit seeking civil penalties against a 
defendant whose violations had ceased by the time the citizen's suit was 
filed, on the ground that civil penalties for violations that have ceased by 
the time the plaintiff's suit is filed do not redress any of a private 
plaintiff's injury in fact. 221 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of whether Laidlaw is interpreted as a decision that has 
"effected no significant change in standing doctrine"223 or as a decision 
that has made a "significant change in environmental standing 
doctrine,"114 or a "sea change in constitutional standing principles,"215 that 
"has unnecessarily opened the standing floodgates, rendering ... 
standing inquiry 'a sham,"'226 La1aJawclearly is the first decision by the 
United States Supreme Court to address in depth the issue of how a 
plaintiff can establish recreational and aesthetic injury in fact in a case 
against a defendant who is either discharging pollutants into a body of 
water or emitting pollutants into the outdoor ambient air. 
LaJaJaw recognizes that a person can establish recreational or 
aesthetic injury in fact by showing both (1) that he or she uses an area 
"affected" by a defendant's allegedly unlawful pollution of a water body 
or outdoor ambient air and (2) that the defendant's challenged pollution 
of the water body or outdoor air "lessens" the plaintiff's recreational or 
aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected" area.227 Courts in future cases 
involving air or water pollution will have to determine, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether a specific place used by a plaintiff for recreational or 
aesthetic enjoyment is part of the area "affected" by a defendant's 
challenged pollutant discharges or emissions. Although the distance 
221. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186. 
222. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S 83, 106-07 (1998). Justice 
Ginsburg, in the final part of her opinion in Laidlaw, also held that the suit had not become moot 
as a matter of law simply because the defendant achieved substantial compliance with its permit 
after the plaintiff's suit was flied or because the defendant closed its facility after the plaintiff's 
suit was flied. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189-94. In this part of her decision, Justice Ginsburg 
distinguished standing from mootness. Jd at 189-92. 
223. Am. Littoral Soc'y v. United States EPA, 199 F. Supp. 2d 217, 231 n.8 (D. N.J. 2002). 
224. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 165 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring). 
225. Jd at 164 (Niemeyer, J., concurring). 
226. Id at 165 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
227. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183. 
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between the specific place used by the plaintiff and the place where the 
defendant discharges or emits pollutants is a significant factor in the 
determination of whether the specific place is part of the "affected area," 
courts in making these determinations also will have to take into account 
the type of CWA or CAA violation allegedly committed by the defendant 
and other circumstantial evidence that assists a court in determining if 
the concentrations, in or near the specific area used by the plaintiff, of the 
type of pollutant discharged or emitted by the defendant, are sufficiently 
high enough to "affect" the area. 228 
Courts applying Laidlaw in future cases also will have to decide if a 
plaintiff has established that the defendant's pollutant discharges or 
. emissions have "lessened," or threaten to lessen, the plaintiff's recrea-
tional or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected" area.229 When applying 
Laidlaw to make such determinations, courts will face particular 
difficulty in citizen suits seeking injunctive relief where a plaintiff alleges 
imminent future recreational or aesthetic injury on the basis of the 
plaintiff refraining from recreational use of an "affected" area because of 
concerns about the defendant's pollutant discharges or emissions and on 
the basis of statements that the plaintiff would engage in recreational 
activities in the affected area in the near future if the defendant's illegal 
pollutant discharges or emissions ceased. 
Of course, a court does not face any such difficulties when a 
plaintiff organization in a CWA or CAA citizen suit either alleges and 
establishes (1) past injury in fact (for standing to seek civil penalties) on 
the basis of its members' allegations and sworn statements asserting that 
their actual past recreational use and enjoyment of an area affected by the 
defendant's challenged activity was lessened in the past by the 
defendant's challenged activity; or (2) future imminent injury (for 
standing to seek injunctive relief) on the basis of its members' allegations 
and statements that in the imminent near future they actually will use part 
of the "affected" area for recreational activity or aesthetic enjoyment and 
that their future recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the "affected" area 
will be lessened by the defendant's allegedly unlawful discharges or 
emissions of pollutants. Recreational and aesthetic injury in fact clearly 
are established by such allegations and proof of both (1) actual past or 
imminent future recreational use of an "affected" area by the plaintiff and 
(2) actual lessening of the plaintiff's recreational or aesthetic enjoyment 
of the affected area when the plaintiff actually uses the "affected" area. 
228. SeeidatJ84. 
229. See id at 184-85. 
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Laidlaw, however, now permits a plaintiff also to establish 
recreational and aesthetic injury in fact even if the person has not actually 
recreationally used the affected area in the past and does not assert that 
she will engage in recreational use of the affected area in the imminent 
near future, when that person establishes that she refrains from 
recreational use of the affected area because of reasonable concerns and 
fears about the effects of the defendant's allegedly unlawful pollutant 
discharges or emissions and that she would begin recreational use of the 
affected area if the defendant's allegedly unlawful pollutant discharges or 
emissions ceased. 
